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ABSTRACT 
 
Kang, Youngho (Ph.D., Economics) 
Three Essays on the Selection Effect of Trade and Labor Market Rigidity 
Dissertation directed by Professor Robert McNown 
   
 
This dissertation investigates the impact of labor market conditions on the 
selection effect that trade causes. Since the selection effect can affect the labor 
market outcomes positively, this includes issues pertaining to improve the worker‟s 
welfare in the long term. As a result, the main goal of the dissertation is to 
investigate which labor market conditions can boost the aggregate total factor 
productivity as the economy is more open to trade.    
In the first chapter, I examine when trade could cause the selection effect. If 
the increased average real wage induced by trade triggers the selection effect 
(Melitz, 2003), the main issue is to determine the labor market conditions under 
which trade raises the average real wage. According to the results of regressions of 
the average and 10th percentile of residual wages, this paper shows that with high 
union density, low job destruction, and low job creation, the effect of trade on the 
average residual wage is likely to be negative because the impact of imports exceeds 
that of exports. Moreover, the impact of trade on the average wage must work 
through the residual wage because this study does not find any significant impact of 
trade on average predicted wage. As a result, the more rigid the labor market is, the 
iv 
 
less likely trade is to raise the average industrial wage and the less likely the 
selection effect in Melitz (2003) is to occur.  
In the second chapter, based on the results from the first chapter, I examines 
whether job flows can improve the aggregate total factor productivity by using U.S. 
industry data set.   
In the third chapter, it investigates how rigidity in labor market institutions 
influences the selection effect as the economy is more open to trade. Findings from 
dynamic ordinary least square (DOLS) suggest that higher labor market rigidity in 
an open economy reduces the TFP through the negative selection effect. In 
particular, in extremely high rigidity but low foreign R&D stock, the openness to 
trade could cause the country to experience decreasing TFP because the negative 
selection effect can offset the international R&D spillover effect.  
 
  
 
 
 
To My Wife, My Daughter and My Son 
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CHAPTER I  
 
TRADE AND WAGE DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS: WHEN DOES 
TRADE CAUSE THE SELECTION EFFECT? 
 
 
 
 I.1 Introduction 
The aggregate productivity gains from trade liberalization can be boosted 
mainly through the reallocation process of domestic resources toward more 
productive firms, i.e. the selection effect of trade.1 Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer 
(2008) have attempted to connect the aggregate productivity gains with the long run 
impact of trade on labor market outcomes; that is, as long as the selection effect of 
trade exists, trade liberalization lowers unemployment and raises the real wage in 
the long run. Implications for aggregate productivity dynamics could shed new light 
on the early debates focusing on the short run and static impact of trade on labor 
market outcomes. However, trade does not always induce the selection effect in long 
run equilibrium. Certain conditions in a period of transition need to be satisfied. 
Otherwise, the selection effect may not occur, or a negative selection effect might 
even occur, as suggested in Archarya and Keller (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008). In particular, this paper demonstrates that the labor market can be involved 
in determining the extent to which trade causes the selection effect in the long run. 
As a result, to investigate the long run impact of trade on labor market outcomes, 
                              
1 In this paper, the selection effect implies a positive selection effect.  
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we should focus on the labor market conditions in the transition path of the 
selection effect. 
This paper attempts to identify the labor market conditions that induce the 
selection effect of trade. Accordingly, my work builds on Melitz (2003) that suggests 
the labor market competition as a mechanism through which the selection effect of 
trade occurs.2 Melitz‟s (2003) argument reading the selection effect is that the 
increase in average real industrial wage induced by exports pushes up aggregate 
productivity by removing the least productive firms from the market. That is, the 
increased average real wage triggers the selection effect. Despite the critical role of 
the increased average real wage, surprisingly little is known about the impact of 
trade on the average real industrial wage from the viewpoint of aggregate 
productivity dynamics. Accordingly, the main question that this paper investigates 
empirically, using U.S. data, is as follows: under which labor market conditions does 
trade raise the average real industrial wage? 
Recent theoretical attempts to employ worker heterogeneity in international 
trade models help to identify labor market conditions due to explaining firms‟ and 
workers‟ heterogeneous responses to trade. Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko 
(2008) show, as the economy becomes more open to trade, how high ability workers 
in non-exporting firms respond to exporting firms‟ better offers relative to non-
exporting firms. Additionally, Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2009) explain why 
firms, under trade liberalization, screen and fire workers with ability below the cut-
                              
2 Archarya and Keller (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) consider product market competition 
as an alternative mechanism to cause the selection effect. 
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off, and further how firms and workers share the firm‟s profit according to 
abilities.3 These studies imply that the compensation for a worker‟s ability could be 
the worker‟s and firm‟s most important criterion for making economic decisions. 
However, though, how can we handle the question of worker heterogeneity, with 
respect to abilities, in an empirical study? Generally, econometricians cannot 
observe a worker‟s heterogeneous abilities directly. As a result there is little 
empirical evidence despite some theoretical attempts. In this situation, a good 
alternative is the residual wage stemming from the Mincerian wage equation, 
because the residual wage reflects the compensation for a worker‟s ability.4 
To understand the relationship between abilities and the residual wage, this 
paper introduces worker heterogeneity with respect to abilities into Blanchflower, 
Oswald, and Sanfey‟s (1996) rent-sharing framework. According to this model, the 
residual wage is determined by a firm‟s profit and by individual bargaining power 
that comes from abilities;5 that is, it reflects the compensation for workers‟ abilities, 
as evaluated by a firm. Therefore, although we cannot observe workers‟ abilities 
empirically, the residual wage enables us to estimate heterogeneous responses of 
firms and workers to changes in the compensation for workers‟ abilities. 
                              
3 Here, the concept of ability in the above theoretical papers implies unobserved skills more than 
observed skills such as education and experience. 
4 Mincerian wage equation is used to estimate the premium of observed skills such as education and 
experience. The residual wage is empirically defined by the residual term in Mincerian wage 
equation. Therefore, it is likely to be connected to unobserved skills that affect the wage. Although 
the more popular term in studies on residual wage is unobserved skills, this paper uses ability 
instead of unobserved skills in order to link with theoretical studies on worker heterogeneity.  
5 This is similar to Lemieux (2006)‟s assumption that residual wage is the product of abilities and 
compensation for them because firm‟s profit is related with firm‟s ability of compensating for 
unobserved skills. 
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Particularly, provided that firms‟ profits and productivities are identified, ability 
cut-offs in firms can be compared to each other.6 
How can the residual wage explain the firm‟s decision to fire and hire 
workers? When a firm is faced with decreasing profit, it will lay off workers with 
low residual wages because those workers are evaluated as being less valuable by 
the firm. In other words, the residual wage reflects how the firm sorts its workers in 
terms of their performance. Also, in hiring workers to respond to increased market 
share, the firm will attempt to screen job applicants with abilities below the cut-off. 
7 In the context of a worker‟s decision, the residual wage implies that workers with 
the same education level and experience could be paid differently according to the 
firm‟s profit, which helps explain the worker‟s motivation to search for a better job. 
If high-ability workers are in an unproductive firm, they will have the motivation to 
move toward a more productive firm in order to earn more compensation through 
individual bargaining. As a result, in a rent-sharing framework, the firm‟s and 
worker‟s decisions respond to changes in the firm‟s profit, which causes job flow.8  
                              
6 Firms with high productivity can cover huge recruiting cost to hire high-ability workers, while 
unproductive firms cannot afford to pay high recruiting cost. Therefore, unproductive firms are more 
likely to hire workers with low abilities than firms with high productivity because the adverse effect 
could be in unproductive firm‟s recruiting process. Therefore, this paper assumes that the cut-off is 
closely related to firm‟s productivity as suggested in Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2009). 
7 According to Huang and Cappelli (2006), firms can evaluate job applicants‟ abilities by using 
popular screening practices such as reference letters and obtaining the agent‟s past histories through 
credit bureaus or hiring detectives. 
8 Krueger and Summers (1988) and Gibbson and Katz (1992) focus on the reallocation of workers 
from low to high wages industries; that is, they examine why workers with the same education level 
and experience are paid differently in different industries. The residual in this paper explains why 
the workers move from unproductive firms to more productive firms in the same industry as well as 
across industries. 
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Trade liberalization affects firms‟ profits according to their productivity 
(Melitz, 2003). Thus, as the economy becomes more open to trade, firms and 
workers make heterogeneous responses to the changes in the profit, which 
determines the average residual wage at the industrial level. These responses 
suggest two main channels through which trade affects the average residual 
industrial wage: both the change in the firm‟s profitability, and job flow. Without 
considering job flow, the influence on the residual wages of the change in a firm‟s 
profit from trade is obvious: imports lower the workers‟ residual wages because 
imports make the firm‟s market share shrink. In a similar way, exports raise the 
workers‟ residual wages. 
However, taking job flow into consideration, the impact of trade on the 
average residual wage is more complicated. In the case of exports, the direction of 
each channel‟s impact is positive. With higher exports, exporting firms can make 
better offers to both inside and outside workers. Therefore, the workers who are 
compensated less relative to high abilities have the motivation to move toward 
exporting firms voluntarily due to the increased chances of obtaining a better job;9 
that is, the impact of job flow would depend on the magnitude of job creation in 
exporting firms. In sum, the impact of exports on the average residual wage is 
positive, and the residual wage becomes more dispersed, and left-skewed, the more 
job creation in exporting firms is working actively. 
                              
9 Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) also argues that as the salary gap between exporting 
and non-exporting firms is widen due to increased exports, the workers with high ability have more 
motivation to move toward exporting firms.     
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On the other hand, the impact of imports on the residual wage distribution 
depends on the relative magnitude of the profit and job flow channels. Through a 
firm‟s profit, imports lower the residual wages. However, we must also consider the 
job flow channel. Increased imports also cause the marginal workers in firms, and 
the workers in marginal firms, to exit the market. 10  The effect of this job 
destruction is to raise the average residual wage at the industry level. That is, the 
directions of the two channels‟ effects are opposite. Therefore, there is still the 
possibility of removing the negative effect of import on the average (residual) wage 
without controlling for job destruction.11 Unlike exports, with imports, the higher 
the job destruction, the less the residual wage is dispersed. 
For empirical analysis, I use four datasets: Merged Outgoing Rotation 
Groups Current Population Survey (MORG-CPS), U.S. Trade by Feenstra (1998), 
Job Creation and Job Destruction by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Kim (2006), and 
Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database by Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray 
(2000).12 The MORG-CPS provides me with a huge dataset as well as a less noisy 
                              
10 The case of marginal workers is similar to the cleansing effect in recession (Barlevy, 2000).  
11 Revenga (1992) summarizes and criticizes the early literatures which show insignificant or small 
impact of imports on the wage and employment (for example, Mann (1988), Grossman (1987)). In 
addition, Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) point out that Grossman (1987)‟s methodology lacks 
treatment of cross-industry effects in estimating import price elasticity. However, due to job flow, 
there is the possibility of the positive relationship between imports and the average (residual) wage. 
This can be connected to the results in Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan and Phillips (2009). They 
examine why the impact of import penetration on wages is empirically small despite having a 
relatively large impact on employment. They attempt to calculate occupation-specific import 
penetration in order to control for job destruction. By using it, they find a significant, negative, and 
sizeable impact of import penetration on individual wages. 
12  While investigating the relationship between manufacturing wages and international trade, 
Gaston and Trefler (1994) use the CPS in order to reflect the characteristics of individual workers in 
the industry. Recently, Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan and Phillips (2009) and Liu and Trefler 
(2008) have attempted to link industry-level data on offshoring activies of U.S. multinational firms, 
import penetration, and export shares with the CPS.    
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measure of the key variable of interest (compensation per hour) relative to March 
CPS or PSID (Lemieux, 2006). This is important because this paper restricts the 
sample to full-time male workers in the manufacturing sector and obtains the 
residual wage from hourly wages by using the Mincerian wage equation. The 
dependent variables are the average and 10th percentile of estimated residual wage. 
Those dependent variables and explanatory variables such as job flow enable us to 
understand how the residual wage distribution is changed by trade, and to examine 
the labor market conditions under which trade raises the average residual wage at 
the industry level. 
Since it is difficult to measure trade liberalization by changes in policy, the 
typical approach is to use trade openness, transaction costs, tariffs and so forth as 
proxies for trade liberalization. Alternatively, this paper attempts to capture trade 
liberalization by using import penetration, export propensity, and the real 
industrial shipment.13 Particularly, the real industrial shipment controls for other 
factors such as changes in consumer‟s taste and technology. Furthermore, this 
paper uses U.S import weighted average tariffs as a robustness check in measuring 
trade liberalization. 
This paper employs a dynamic panel model in order to reflect the persistence 
of residual wage distribution.14 According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the 
within estimator cannot sufficiently control for the endogeneity problems induced 
                              
13 Import penetration is the share of import in domestic consumption i.e. 
(imports)/(shipment+imports-exports). Export propensity is also the share of exports in domestic 
production i.e. (exports)/(shipment+imports-exports). 
14 Since some interviewers in MORG-CPS can be observed between two years, the variables of 
interest are likely to be persistent. 
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by the use of the lagged dependent variable as the explanatory variable, the 
measurement error arising in pseudo panel and the issue of reverse causality. In 
order to avoid these endogeneity problems, I employ the system GMM (General 
Method of Moments) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). In particular, 
I use Bowsher‟s (2002) suggestion and the standard error correction by Windmeijer 
(2005) in order to avoid overfitting bias and the small sample bias, respectively.  
 I find that the import penetration lowers the average residual wage, but the 
export propensity raises the average residual wage. The impact of import 
penetration especially depends on the level of job destruction, while that of export 
propensity depends on the level of job creation. When much job destruction occurs, 
the impact of import penetration on the average residual wage changes toward 
being positive. This interesting result is also supported by the evidence from the 
10th percentile regression. Particularly, the regression of the 10th percentile of 
residual wage on job destruction shows that the left-tail of the residual wage 
distribution will be cut off as more job destruction occurs.  
In addition, as job creation increases, the impact of export propensity on 
average residual wage is more positively sizeable. This result is predicted in 
Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding 
(2008); that is, in response to increased exports, exporting firms hire workers with 
abilities above the cut-off rather than the unemployed. Therefore, despite job 
creation induced by exporters, workers with abilities below the cut-off are still likely 
to be unemployed.  
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In sum, this paper shows that with high union density, low job destruction, 
and low job creation, the effect of trade on average residual wage is likely to be 
negative. This is because without active job flow, the imports‟ negative impact on 
residual wages exceeds the exports‟ positive impact on residual wages; that is, trade 
liberalization is likely to be negatively associated with average residual wage in the 
more rigid labor market. In addition, this paper attempts to check the robustness of 
those results by measuring trade liberalization as the degree of tariff, finding 
consistent results. 
Moreover, to link those results with the impact of trade on average real 
industrial wage, this paper runs the regression of the predicted average wage on 
import penetration and export propensity.15  According to the results, trade is 
shown to have an insignificant impact. This result is anticipated by the fact that the 
Mincerian wage equation does not reflect industrial characteristics. As a result, the 
impact of trade on the average industrial wage is determined only by the residual 
wage. Consequently, since trade liberalization in the more rigid labor market does 
not increase the average industrial wage, the selection effect is unlikely to occur and 
so worker‟s welfare under those conditions will not be raised in the long-run. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I show the 
conceptual framework in order to understand how worker and firm make their 
decision according to residual wage. I present a description of the dataset and the 
estimation strategy in Section 3. Section 4 contains the results from regressions of 
                              
15 The average real wage can be decomposed into the predicted average wage and the residual 
average wage.  
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several dependent variables on import penetration, export propensity, job flow, etc. 
Section 5 shows the result of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
I.2 An Illustrative Model   
The purpose of this section is to explain i) how the residual wage is 
determined and ii) how trade affects the average residual wage at the industry level 
through what channels. For this, I modify the model in Blanchflower, Oswald, and 
Sanfey (1996) by making the worker‟s bargaining power dependent on his/her 
ability, and by employing the production function used in Helpman, Itskhoki, and 
Redding (2008).16 This model is straightforward and useful in deriving implications 
for estimation.  
Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2008) effectively use the following 
production function to describe why the firm attempts to screen workers with 
abilities below the cut-off: 
ahy  , 10   , 
where   is firm‟s productivity, h  is labor supply, ia  is worker i ‟s ability, and a  is 
the average of workers‟ ability in a firm. Worker ability ( ia ) and firm productivity (
 ) are assumed to be drawn from a Pareto distribution, with cumulative 
                              
16 Blanchflower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1996) explain the positive relationship between profit and 
wage. This rent-sharing model is relevant in U.S. manufacturing because Estevao and Tevlin (2003) 
find a substantial amount of rent sharing. In particular, Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) show that 
import penetration affects the compensation structure through changing the sensitivity of pay to 
performance in their sample of U.S. executives. 
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distribution function, ka aaaG )/(1)( min  for 0min  aa  and 2k  and 
zG )/(1)( min    for 0min   and 2z , 2k , respectively. 
Thus, this production function depends upon the productivity of the firm ( ), 
the average of abilities in a firm ( a ), and the number of workers hired ( h ). The 
including average ability in the production function gives the firm a motive to 
screen out workers with abilities below the cut-off. If the firm fires the workers with 
abilities below the cut-off, the effect of increased average ability in a firm could 
exceed the effect of the decreased number of workers. With a Pareto distribution of 
worker abilities, the average ability in a firm is given by )1/(  kkaa c . Since the 
average ability level of the workers in a firm is dependent on a screening cut-off ca , 
the firm will determine this cut-off based on the screening costs it must pay.  
This paper also uses screening costs as modeled in Helpman, Itskhoki, and 
Redding (2008). It assumes that if the firm pays a screening cost of  /cca , it can 
screen the workers with abilities below ca  inside and outside of the firm. Since the 
firm needs costlier tests for higher ability cutoffs, screening costs are an increasing 
function of ability cutoff, ca , chosen by the firm. Therefore, we can conceptualize 
setting the cut-off as directly related to the firm‟s productivity. The firm also 
confronts other costs. Production involves a fixed production cost of df . For serving 
the foreign market, the firm incurs a fixed exporting cost of xf  and variable trade 
costs. Particularly, this variable trade cost takes the iceberg form, such that 1  
units of a variety must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive in the other 
country.  
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Having defined the production function and associated costs, we can now 
build the profit function, xxdc
ch
ci
ix fIfa
c
wpyI  




 )1( . We can also define 
the bargaining model through which wage is determined. Worker‟s utility is 
assumed to be a function of individual wage. Therefore, in the bargaining model 
where the firm and its individual employee negotiate wage and employment status, 
the maximization problem is as follows: 
 log))(1())()(log()( 





ch
ci
i
ch
ci
ii awuwuaMax                                (1) 
where )( iwu  is worker i ‟s utility from wage iw  and w  is the wage available to the 
worker by obtaining temporary work in the event of a breakdown in bargaining. 
Since temporary work does not reflect returns to ability, w  can be interpreted as 
general compensation for education and experience in the economy.   is the 
bargaining power of an employee. Here, the bargaining power is determined by the 
worker‟s ability, ia , because the firm takes longer to replace a high ability worker, 
and the firm is likely to earn zero in the event of a bargaining delay. Although the 
above maximization problem has three choice variables, h , ca , and iw , this paper 
derives the first-order condition with respect to iw  because the introduction of 
worker heterogeneity makes the optimization problem more complicated when 
maximization is with respect to h  and ca . Furthermore, the first-order condition 
with respect to iw  is sufficient to explain how the residual wage is determined and 
thereby construct the estimation equation. 
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At an interior optimum, the following first-order condition with respect iw  
holds:  
iw : 0
)(1
)]()([
)(')(



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
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
ch
ci
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i
ii
a
wuwu
wua
                                              (2) 
 
Rewriting the first of these, we obtain 
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                                                (3) 
which can be simplified by using )(')()()( iii wuwwwuwu   to produce the 
equilibrium residual wage as follows: 



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.                                              (4) 
Equation (4) is useful for understanding how the residual wage is determined. It 
shows that, to a first-order approximation, the equilibrium residual wage is 
determined by profit and the relative bargaining strength between the firm and its 
individual employee, according to an employee‟s ability; that is, it reflects the 
compensation for workers‟ abilities, as evaluated by the firm. This is similar to 
Lemieux (2006)‟s interpretation that the residual wage is the product of abilities 
with the return to abilities. Therefore, the residual wage implies that workers with 
the same education level and experience may be paid differently according to the 
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firm‟s productivity or profit. Moreover, workers with the same education level and 
experience in the same firm may be paid differently according to their performance.   
From equation (4), we know that profit and bargaining power affect the slope 
in the relationship between the residual wage and abilities. Therefore, we can set 
up the schedule of the residual wage to abilities in an exporting firm and a non-
exporting firm. <Figure 1> shows these schedules in an environment characterized 
by a low degree of openness: 
<<Figure 1>> 
n
ca  is the cut-off point for a non-exporting firm; if a worker has abilities less than 
the cut-off, the worker is unemployable. The returns to high ability workers will be 
higher in both an exporting and a non-exporting firm. The difference between the 
two slopes implies that an exporting firm can make more profit and better offers. 
When there is a low degree of openness, the difference in the two slopes is not large. 
In this case, the workers ( a > nca ) in a non-exporting firm have less motivation to 
move toward an exporting firm.17  
Additionally, an exporting firm will invest more, relative to a non-exporter, 
in a screening mechanism to identify workers with abilities below the cut-off, in 
order to retain high ability inside workers, and to obtain high ability outside 
workers. That is, due to paying additional costs such as the exporting fixed cost and 
transportation cost, an exporting firm should be more productive, and hence need 
                              
17 This is similar to “Cross-Skill Matching” equilibrium. Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) 
defines it as one in which high-skill workers are willing to accept low-tech jobs. Additionally, they 
define an “Ex-Post Segmentation” equilibrium as one in which skilled workers are not willing to do 
so. 
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workers with high abilities. Therefore, the cut-off point of an exporting firm, eca , is 
higher than that of a non-exporting firm. 
Through <Figure 2>, we can discern how the distribution of residual wage 
changes as the economy becomes more open to trade. A higher degree of trade 
openness in a country where intra-industry trade dominates implies higher import 
penetration and higher export propensity in the same industry. First, the impact of 
increased import penetration on residual wages is shown by arrows (1) and (2) in 
<Figure 2>. When import penetration increases, the higher competition in the 
domestic market requires a non-exporting firm to have workers with higher 
abilities. Thus, the cut-off for a non-exporting firm increases by nca .
18 
Consequently, workers with abilities below the new cut-off and workers in marginal 
firms will be unemployed. This effect of increased imports (arrow (2)) raises the 
average residual wage as <Figure 2>. However, there is another effect of increased 
imports (arrow (1)). Import penetration also makes the curve of non-exporting firms 
shift downward because the reduced domestic market share causes decreasing 
profit. Therefore, the impact of increased imports on the average residual wage 
depends on the relative magnitude of the two effects; that is, when job destruction 
below the new cut-off ( nca ) occurs more, the effect of the shifting downward curve on 
the average residual wage is decreased. 
<<Figure 2>> 
                              
18 In a different way, increased import penetration pushes up the cut-off for a non-exporting firm 
productivity ( ). Therefore, since surviving non-exporting firms are likely to have a higher screening 
cut-off, the new cut-off ( n
ca ) is higher than 
n
ca .     
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 Furthermore, arrows (3) and (4) represent the influence of increased export 
propensity. A higher degree of trade openness implies that the existing exporters 
can sell more abroad, and some non-exporting firms can start to export, which 
causes increases in exporting firms‟ profits and labor demand. Therefore, an 
exporting firm‟s slope shifts outward (arrow (3)) and the cut-off of an exporting firm 
lowers, because the decrease in export costs enables a non-exporting firm with a 
cutoff slightly below that of an exporter to join the foreign markets (arrow (4)). In 
particular, the gap between an exporter‟s slope and a non-exporter‟s slope is 
widening. As a result, workers with ability above eca  in exporting firms have more 
motivation to move toward exporting firms because of higher compensation for their 
ability.19 At this point, the key point is that job creation in incumbent and newly 
exporting firms accelerates this process. This implies that exporting firms are likely 
to search for workers with abilities above the cut-off in the pool of the employed 
rather than the pool of the unemployed. 20  As job creation in exporting firms 
increases, the impact of exports on the residual wage also increases. 
The implications derived from this conceptual framework shed an important 
light on our construction of the estimation model in Section 3 and interpretation of 
the results of regressions in Section 4. 
 
                              
19 This implies that the economy moves from a “Cross-Skill Matching” equilibrium to an “Ex-Post 
Segmentation” in Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008). 
20 Menezes Filho and Muendler (2007) show the interesting evidence that tariff cuts and additional 
imports trigger worker displacements, but that neither comparative-advantage sectors nor exports 
absorb trade-displaced worker. This evidence implies that an exporting firm searches its workers in 
the pool of employed, rather than unemployed. 
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I.3 Data and Estimation Strategy 
Data Description 
The best way to examine the impact of job flow induced by trade on the 
average residual wage, as described in section II is to use a matched employee-
employer dataset. However, generally speaking, these matched employee-employer 
datasets are not made publicly available. To answer the main question empirically 
then, I combine several data sets: Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups Current 
Population Survey (MORG-CPS), U.S. Trade by Feenstra (1998), Job Creation and 
Destruction by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Kim (2006), and Manufacturing Industry 
Productivity Database by Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2000).  
The CPS is a monthly household survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics to gather information on the labor force characteristics of the U.S. 
population. According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), households are interviewed 
in four consecutive months, ignored for eight months, and then interviewed again 
for another four months. The CPS-MORG consists of households in their 4th and 8th 
interview. Lemieux (2006) shows that this data is more reliable than alternative 
sources of wage data, such as March CPS, because it provides a less noisy measure 
of the key variable of interest, compensation per hour. In addition, the CPS-MORG 
has a larger number of observations than PSID or March/May CPS.21 This feature 
is important in enabling me to restrict the sample to full-time male workers aged 16 
                              
21 The MORG supplement is roughly three times as large as the May or March supplements of the 
CPS. 
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to 64 in the manufacturing sector. This paper also divides the industry using a 
narrower classification, thereby obtaining 74 categories of industry. 22  This 
narrower classification would be difficult without the large number of observations 
provided by the CPS-MORG. 
For information on wage, I use hourly wages as reported in the CPS-MORG 
because theories of wage determination are closely connected with the hourly wage 
rate.23 Real hourly wage is calculated by using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). As 
in Lemieux (2006), I trim extreme values of wages (less than $1 and more than $100 
in 1979 dollars) and weight wage observations using the CPS weights. In addition, 
top-coded weekly and hourly wages are multiplied by a factor of 1.4.24 I draw the 
distribution of real hourly wage for full-time male workers in the manufacturing 
sector in both 1983 and 1994 using the kernel density method. Panel (a) in <Figure 
3> shows that the hourly real wage in 1994 is more dispersed than in 1983, as 
suggested in many studies on inequality of real hourly wage.  
Information on observable skills such as education and experience is 
required to obtain the residual wage. When using schooling as a regressor in wage 
                              
22 CPS has its own industry classification based on SIC code. There are some sectors which cannot be 
divided by SIC87 3-digit. So I merge them; that is, primary aluminum industry and other primary 
metal industry are merged; scientific and controlling instruments industry and medical, dental, and 
optical instrumental and supplies industry are also merged. And, I exclude leather tanning and 
finishing industry and watches, clocks and clockwork operated devices industry because the 
observations is not enough. However, as compared with early literatures, this industry classification 
is very narrow and heterogeneous in terms of cross-section. For example, Revenga (1992) use 38 
three- and four-digit SIC (narrower, wage, employment also negative).  
23 If hourly wage were absent and only weekly wages were recorded, it would be defined as weekly 
wages divided by usual weekly hours for salaried workers.  
24  There are several ways to control top-coded weekly and hourly wage. DiNardo, Fortin, and 
Lemieux (1996) use the upper tail of the 1986 distribution of wages to impute a wage distribution to 
the observations censored at the top-code in other years. Also, according to the CPS questionnaire, it 
recommends them to be removed.  
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equations, the CPS has the well-known problem that schooling is not measured 
using a consistent questionnaire over time; that is, after 1992, a question about the 
highest graduate attended switched to the highest grade or diploma completed, 
instead of asking whether the highest grade was completed. Nonetheless, Lemieux 
(2006) suggests a possible way to construct a relatively consistent variable for years 
of schooling completed over the whole sample period. In his manner, this paper 
classifies years of schooling completed into nine groups: 0-4, 5-8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13-15, 
16, and 17+. Also, experience is measured by a proxy variable, age. 
Additionally, from the CPS-MORG, I obtain the union density rate across 
industries in order to reflect labor market conditions. Other indexes utilized in this 
paper are import penetration and export propensity from Feenstra (1998), job 
destruction and job creation from Foster, Haltiwanger, and Kim (2006), and real 
shipments from Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2000). These indices are measured 
by SIC 4-digit, so I match them into the CPS industry classification based on SIC 3-
digit.25 Since information on unions in the MORG-CPS only exists after 1983, and 
Feenstra provides us with a trade index up until 1994, the sample period in this 
paper is from 1983 to 1994. 
The real hourly wage, education, and experience variables enable estimation 
of the residual wage. In the sample of full-time male workers in the manufacturing 
sector, the residuals come from separate regressions of the logarithm of real hourly 
                              
25 In matching trade index and job flow index, I use output and employment in Bartelsman, Becker, 
and Gray (2000) dataset as weights. 
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wages on age, a quadratic in age, and nine schooling dummies for each year.26 
<Table 1> contains the estimation result of the Mincerian wage equation. The row 
of Stdev, the standard deviation of coefficients of eight schooling dummies, shows 
that the inequality among premiums on years of schooling is increasing. 
Particularly, the last row implies that the college premium is also increasing, 
coinciding with results in early literature.27 In addition, panel (b) in <Figure 3> 
shows the distribution of full time male workers‟ residual wages in both 1983 and 
1994. Similar to panel (a) in <Figure 3>, the distribution in 1994 is more dispersed.  
Furthermore, I draw the cumulative distribution functions for residual 
wages in several industries in order to capture the impact of import penetration in 
industries with different labor market conditions. <Figure 4> and <Figure5> show 
the cumulative distribution functions of residual wages in industries with high 
rates of change in import penetration. However, the industries in <Figure 4> have 
high rates of change in job destruction, while the industries in <Figure 5> are 
characterized as having low rates of change in job destruction.28 Compared with 
<Figure 4>, the 1994 residual wage distributions in <Figure 5> are located wholly 
to the left of 1983 residual wage distributions. Additionally, the 1994 cumulative 
                              
26 Lemieux (2006) uses the interactions between schooling dummies and a quadratic in age in order 
to improve R2. This paper does not use interactions in order to emphasize that residual wages imply 
differences within a group with the same education and experience. 
27 Here, the college premium is calculated by subtracting the coefficient of ed6 from that of ed8. 
Since ed7 is 13-15 years of schooling completed, it is not relevant for college premium. Therefore, the 
paper assumes that 16 years of schooling is the bachelor degree. The college premium is the 
difference of wage between graduates from high school and ones from college. 
28 The logging industry and the office and accounting machines industry in <Figure 4> are amongst 
the top five industries for change rate of job turnover. Although the job turnover reflects the labor 
market rigidity well, however, I use the job destruction index in order to connect them with <Figure 
2>. 
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distribution functions in <Figure 5> have a longer left-tail than the 1983 ones. This 
evidence provides suggestive support for the role of arrow (1) and arrow (2) in 
<Figure 2>. As a result, we can infer that a high change rate of job destruction 
enables an industry exposed to highly increased imports to have fewer workers with 
low residual wage. Additionally, <Table 2> reports the minimum, average, and 
maximum values of variables in order to calculate the marginal effects. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
This paper introduces the dependent variables average, and 10th percentile, 
of estimated residual wages at the industry level.29 These dependent variables 
enable us to capture the response of residual wage distribution characteristics to 
trade. Equation (5) is the starting point in order to capture the impact of imports 
and exports on the residual wage.  
tststststststs rshipimpuniRwRw ,,5,4,3,21,1, lnexplnln       (5) 
where tsRw , is the average, or 10
th percentile, of the residual wage in industry s  at 
time t ; tsuni ,  is the union density of industry s  at time t ; tsimp ,ln  is the logarithm of 
the import penetration ratio for industry s  at time t ; ts,expln  is the logarithm of the 
export propensity ratio for industry s  at time t ; tsrship ,ln  is the logarithm of real 
shipments in industry s  at time t ; ts ,  consists of the s  industry-specific effect ( s ), 
                              
29 This strategy has an advantage to avoid the Moulton problem. If we construct the estimation 
equation with individual-level dependent variable and industry-level independent variables, the 
Moulton problem would make the standard errors underestimated. According to Angrist and Pischke 
(2009), using group averages instead of microdata is a good way to avoid the Moulton problem. 
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the time-specific effect ( t ), and the error-term ( ts, ). In particular, the logarithm of 
real shipments controls for third factors such as changes in consumer‟s taste and 
technology. Therefore, the addition of real industrial shipments enables trade 
openness in this empirical model to be more closely connected with trade 
liberalization, as in Melitz (2003). 
To answer the main question in this paper, however, I need to modify 
equation (5). From comparison of <Figure 4> with <Figure 5>, we can discern that 
the distributional consequence of import penetration on individual residual wages is 
dependent on the level of job destruction. This yields intuition as to how to construct 
the empirical equations in order to identify the role of each arrow in <Figure 2>. To 
reflect this intuition, I modify equation (5) to yield equations (6)-(8) by adding 
interaction terms with union density, job destruction and job creation, respectively. 
However, while running the regression of the 10th percentile of residual wage, I use 
equations (5)-(7) to identify the arrow (2) in <Figure 2>.  
][lnln ,,4,3,21,1, tstststststs uniimpimpuniRwRw                
       tststststs rshipuni ,,7,,6,5 ln]exp[lnexpln        (6) 
tststststststststs rshipnegimpimpnegRwRw ,,6,5,,4,3,21,1, lnexpln][lnln   
   (7) 
tststststststststs rshipposimpposRwRw ,,6,,5,4,3,21,1, ln]exp[lnexplnln   
   (8) 
where tsneg ,  is job destruction in industry s  at time t ; tspos ,  is job creation in 
industry s  at time t .  
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Although the CPS is a repeated cross-section, I can construct industry-level 
panel data in order to estimate equations (5)-(8). However, the MORG-CPS consists 
of households in their 4th and 8th interview. As a result, some interviewers are likely 
to be observed between two years. Since this makes the sample persistent, I use 
dynamic panel analysis. However, the dynamic model permits regressors to include 
lagged dependent variables, which causes an endogeneity problem.30 Moreover, the 
reverse causality between the residual wage and job flow in the equation may occur; 
that is, the increase of residual wage in exporting firms causes high-ability workers 
in non-exporting firms to move toward exporting firms voluntarily, which affects job 
destruction positively. This also engenders an endogeneity problem. Additionally, 
according to Cameron and Triviedi (2005), measurement error induces the 
endogeneity problem in the case of building industry-level panel data using an 
individual-level data set.    
The endogeneity problems presented above suggest use of the system GMM 
estimator. The main strength of this estimator is to provide more consistent and 
efficient estimates in the presence of endogeneity problems.31 The system GMM 
estimator is proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) in order to overcome a 
significant shortcoming of the first-difference GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). According to Blundell and Bond, the instruments used with the first-
difference GMM estimator become less informative in models where the variance of 
                              
30 The fixed effects estimates of the lagged dependent variable can be severely biased downwards for 
small T as Nickell (1981) shows. 
31 Collado (1997) suggests the GMM estimator in order to address the endogeneity problem induced 
by the measurement error in Pseudo-panel. The sample used in this paper has the characteristics of 
a pseudo-panel due to aggregating the individual observations by year and industry.  
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the fixed effects is high relative to the variance of the transitory shocks. This 
engenders biased coefficients, and furthermore this problem becomes worse in a 
small sample. However, the system GMM estimator is expected to have much 
smaller finite sample bias due to combining in a system the first-differenced with 
the same equation expressed in levels.32 Especially, this paper uses the standard 
error adjusted by the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction in order to reduce 
finite sample bias. 
As the system GMM estimator is not a panacea, two necessary criteria and 
one possible problem should be noted. First, the system GMM estimator must 
satisfy two criteria: the test for serial correlation in the first-differenced errors and 
the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions. Since a system has first-differences, 
the first test is to check whether serial correlation exists among the error terms, as 
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The other, the Sargan test, evaluates 
whether instruments in this paper are valid. This could suffer from the problem 
that should be noted.  
One possible problem stems from using all the available moment conditions, 
which is referred to overfitting bias. Bowsher (2002) shows that the use of too many 
instruments in GMM estimation causes the p-value of the Sargan test to be close to 
1. This implies that the power of the Sargan test can be lost. To correct this 
problem, this paper restricts instrument sets by not using lags further back than 
4t . This could improve the power of the test for overidentifying restrictions in 
                              
32 According to Hayakawa (2007), the system GMM is less biased than the first difference and the 
level GMM estimator. Since the level GMM estimator has an upward bias and the difference GMM 
estimator has a downward bias, both biases cancel each other out in the system GMM.  
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spite of some loss of the efficiency of the estimates due to fewer instrument 
variables.  
Therefore, I regard the system GMM as the preferred estimator. Since this 
data set aggregates the individual observation by year and industry, all reported 
standard errors and test statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust. In the case of the 
within estimator, I correct the standard errors by using a bootstrapping procedure. 
 
 
I.4 Empirical Results  
The empirical results are presented in <Table 3-4>. Each table presents the 
estimation results based on OLS (column 1), within estimation (column 2), and the 
system GMM (column 3-5) estimator. Also the first three columns in each table 
estimate equation (5) without the interaction term, while the next three columns 
estimate equations (6)-(8) with the interaction. As mentioned above, I will interpret 
the estimation results based on the preferred estimator, the system GMM. 
Before interpreting the results, this paper will evaluate the system GMM 
estimator in terms of the validity of instruments and the model specification. All 
three diagnostic statistics in <Table 3-6> are satisfactory; that is, the Sargan test 
does not reject the over-identification restrictions; the absence of first order serial 
correlation is rejected while the absence of second order serial correlation is not 
rejected. Additionally, I am also concerned with overfitting bias and finite sample 
bias for the system GMM estimator. To avoid overfitting bias, I do not use any lags 
dated further back than 4t , and so all tables in this paper obtain the Sargan test 
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P-value much smaller than 1. In the case of finite sample bias, Bond (2002) suggests 
a useful fact: since the OLS and within estimator are biased in opposite directions, 
the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable estimated by a consistent 
estimator should lie between the OLS and within estimates. All coefficients on the 
lagged dependent variable in <Table 3-4> using system GMM are in this interval. 
This implies that finite sample bias associated with weak instruments is not 
present. In particular, Windmeijer‟s (2005) corrected standard error reduces finite 
sample bias. Therefore, all coefficients estimated by system GMM are consistent 
without problems.  
Looking at column 3 in <Table 3>, the first point to note is that increases in 
import penetration are associated with decreases in average residual wage, while 
increases in export propensity are associated with increases in average residual 
wage. Specifically, an import penetration elasticity of -0.011 in column 3 is 
significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Also the export propensity 
elasticity in column 3 is 0.016 and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
Moreover, the long-run effect of import penetration and export propensity are -0.044 
(SE=0.024) and 0.064 (SE=0.027), respectively.33 34 That is, the export propensity 
elasticity is larger than the import penetration elasticity. If the volume of export is 
                              
33 The long-run effect is calculated as follows: the long-run effect of an import penetration elasticity 
is )1/( 13   =-0.011/(1-0.755)=-0.044 in column 3; the long-run effect of an export propensity is 
0.016/(1-0.755)=0.064. The standard errors in the long-run effect are computed by the Delta-method. 
34 Despite of significance of those coefficients, the size of the coefficient is somewhat small relative to 
Revenga (1992) with the import price elasticity of 0.06. A possible explanation is use of a different 
data set. Contrary to this paper, Revenga (1992) uses the quarterly import price for the index of 
import competition. 
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similar to that of imports, it implies that trade may raise the average residual 
wage.  
However, the above implication depends on the labor market conditions as 
suggested in section II. Let‟s focus attention on column 4-6 in <Table 3a>. In column 
4, my intention is to capture the role of the labor market by interacting union 
density with import penetration and export propensity, respectively. Column 4 in 
<Table 3a> shows that the interaction term between union density and import 
penetration is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. This implies 
that union density could be the crucial channel through which increased imports 
affect the average residual wage. In order to shed additional light on the 
quantitative importance of union density, I calculate the partial derivates of import 
penetration, i.e. the marginal effect. The marginal effect of import penetration 
varies depending on the level of union density. To gauge the range of variation, I 
calculate the derivatives of import penetration at the minimum, median and 
maximum values of union density. These are presented respectively in <Table 3b>. 
According to the first column of <Table 3b>, the marginal effects of import 
penetration decrease, and even change from negative to positive, as union density 
declines. Interestingly, with high union density, the effect of trade on average 
residual wage is likely to be negative because the impact of imports exceeds that of 
exports.35 
                              
35 When the union density has the maximum value, the import penetration elasticity is -0.024 and 
the export propensity elasticity is 0.011. Therefore, -0.024 + 0.011 = -0.013. 
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<Figure 2> dealt with in section II allows us to interpret this evidence more 
clearly. This evidence implies that if the union negatively affects the firm‟s decision 
to fire workers below the cut-off, the denser the union is in increased imports, the 
more the average residual wage is affected by the arrow (1) relative to the arrow (2) 
in <Figure 2>. The union tends to preserve jobs through wage concessions. 
Furthermore, when the union bargains with the firm instead of individual workers, 
the union is likely to prevent the firm from sorting the workers according to 
abilities; that is, the firm with a denser union is less able to fire the workers with 
abilities below the cut-off through sorting.36 Therefore, the denser union dampens 
the effect of arrow (2) in <Figure 2>. As a result, higher union density in the 
industry with increased imports is likely to decrease the average residual wage.  
Column 5 in <Table 3a> suggests more interesting evidence. Here, I use the 
index of job destruction in order to capture the impact of arrow (2) in <Figure 2> 
directly. The interaction term is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, 
while import penetration is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This result corresponds well with <Figure 2>. Similar to the case of union density, I 
calculate the marginal effect of import penetration at the minimum, median and 
maximum values of job destruction. The first column in <Table 3c> shows the 
results. The marginal effects of import penetration increase and change from 
negative to positive as more job destruction occurs. That is, when increased imports 
remove the marginal firms and marginal workers from the market through 
                              
36 The correlation between union density and job destruction is -0.115, while the correlation between 
union density and job creation is -0.260. 
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increasing the cut-off of productivity and abilities respectively, the effect of job 
destruction can offset the decrease in average residual wage induced by decreasing 
profits. This phenomenon is similar to the cleansing effect in the sense that the 
workers with abilities below the cut-off become unemployed. By comparing with the 
coefficient of export propensity, we can determine that the less job destruction 
happens, the more likely the effect of trade on average residual wage is to be 
negative, because the impact of imports exceeds that of exports.37 
Additionally, column 6 in <Table 3a> shows that the impact of exports on the 
average residual wage also depends on labor market conditions. Increased exports 
raise the residual wages in exporting firms because of increased profit, as suggested 
in equation (4). Also, exporting firms attempt to hire more workers with abilities 
above the cut-off. The job creation in the industry with increased exports is likely to 
raise the average residual wage because exporting firms can make better offers 
than non-exporting firms. According to column 6 in <Table 3a>, the interaction 
term between exports and job creation is positive and statistically significant at the 
10% level. This result agrees with the increase in average residual wage anticipated 
by the arrow (4) in <Figure 2>. Particularly, the second column in <Table 3c> 
implies that as job creation increases, the magnitude of the marginal effect of export 
propensity is increasing. The more job creation happens, the more likely the effect of 
                              
37 When job destruction has the minimum value, the import penetration elasticity is -0.036. The 
export propensity elasticity in column 5 is 0.021. Therefore, -0.036 + 0.021 = -0.015. 
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trade on average residual wage is to be positive because the impact of exports 
dominates that of imports.38 
The existence of this causal effect can be supported by analyzing the workers 
located in the lowest percentile of residual wage distribution. For this reason, this 
current paper pays more attention to the 10th percentile of residual wage 
distribution. <Table 4a> shows the regression results from the 10th percentile of 
residual wages. Interestingly, the results in <Table 4a> show a similar pattern to 
that of <Table 3a>. Specifically, the interaction term between import and job 
destruction in column 5 is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, while 
tsimport ,ln  is negative and statistically significant at the same level. According to 
the marginal effect of import penetration reported in <Table 4b>, job destruction 
causes the sizable variation of this marginal effect. That is, job destruction plays a 
critical role in raising the 10th percentile of residual wage. If the selection effect of 
import penetration on the workers with ability below the cut-off exists, then the 10th 
percentile of residual wage would be raised by import penetration. Therefore, as 
more job destruction occurs, the left-tail of the residual wage distribution will be 
cut. This will push up the average residual wage. 
In order to connect these pieces of evidence to Melitz (2003) argument, this 
paper has to examine the impact of trade on the average industrial wage, including 
the average predicted wage as well as residual wage. Therefore, I turn attention to 
the impact of trade on the average predicted wage. <Table 5> reports the results 
                              
38 When job creation has the maximum value, the export propensity is 0.043. The import penetration 
elasticity in column 6 is -0.015. Therefore, 0.043 - 0.015 = 0.028.  
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from regressions of the average predicted wage on trade. According to column 3 in 
<Table 5>, import penetration and export propensity are statistically insignificant 
at the 10% level. We can anticipate this given the fact that the Mincerian wage 
equation does not reflect industrial characteristics. In sum, the impact of trade on 
the average industrial wage is determined only by the residual wage; that is, with 
high union density, low job destruction, and low job creation, the effect of trade on 
the average wage is likely to be negative. Therefore, trade liberalization in a more 
rigid labor market is unlikely to induce the selection effect and thus worker‟s 
welfare will not be raised in the long-run. 
 
 
I.5 Robustness Check  
To check the robustness of above results, this section employs the size of 
tariff as another way to measure trade liberalization. Specifically, in this section I 
examine the impact of U.S. import weighted average tariffs on the average and 10th 
percentile of residual wages, using the following equations:  
        tstststststs tariffunirshipRwRw ,,4,3,21,1, lnln                          (9) 
                       tststststs negposrshipRwRw ,4,3,21,1, ln     
tststststs negtariffpostariff ,,,6,,6 ][ln][ln         (10) 
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where tstariff ,ln  is the logarithm of the tariff in industry s  at time t .
39 However, in 
the 10th percentile regression, the job creation variables ( tspos ,  and ][ln ,, tsts postariff 
) are excluded, because the 10th percentile regression is intended to identify the 
arrow (2) in <Figure 2>.  
According to the results, the logarithm of tariffs is negatively but 
insignificantly associated with the average residual wage. One explanation for this 
lack of significance could be that the decreased tariffs are likely to cause increased 
imports and exports, and thus the impact of imports on the residual average wage 
could be offset by that of exports, and vice versa. However, column 2 in <Table 6a> 
and column 1 in <Table 6b> show that when job creation and job destruction are 
higher, the impact of tariffs on the residual wage is more sizable and significant.  
The regression of 10th percentile of residual wages supports these results. 
Column 3 in <Table 6a> shows that the logarithm of the tariff negatively and 
significantly affects the 10th percentile of residual wages; that is, the lower the tariff 
is, the higher the 10th percentile of residual wage is. Furthermore, column 4 in 
<Table 6a> reports that the interaction term between tariff and job destruction is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This interaction term is 
depicted by the arrow (2) in <Figure 2>, which shows that active job destruction is 
the crucial channel through which trade liberalization, proxied by tariffs, affects the 
10th percentile of residual wage. Specifically, my results show that the magnitude of 
the marginal effect of tariffs is increasing with job destruction. These results are 
                              
39 The variable of tariff refers to U.S. import weighted tariffs (duties/custom value). Schott provides 
this dataset on his website (http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm). 
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consistent with the impact of trade openness on the average and 10th percentile of 
residual wages.  
 
 
I.5 Conclusion 
Under which labor market conditions does trade raise the average real 
industrial wage? This paper shows that with low union density, high job 
destruction, and high job creation, trade would raise the average real industrial 
wage. In fact, job creation is closely related with job destruction. According to 
Scarpetta et al (2002), employment protection legislation (EPL) prevents new firms 
from entering the market because of higher firing costs. Job destruction and job 
creation are in fact just two sides of the same coin. That is, more job destruction 
can induce more job creation. Therefore, as trade is increasingly liberalized, job 
turnover is increasingly important in order to cause the selection effect of trade 
found in Melitz (2003). 
This implication sheds new light on the study of trade and aggregate 
productivity. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Archaya and Keller (2008) suggest 
that trade can lower aggregate productivity under unilateral trade and high entry 
barriers, respectively. In particular, the high entry barrier in Archaya and Keller 
(2008) can be connected to labor demand, i.e. the job creation. Therefore, as 
suggested in this paper, labor market conditions can be an important causal link; if 
rigidity in the labor market causes firms to incur high firing costs, trade will lower 
the average real industrial wage and the selection effect of trade found in Melitz 
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(2003) will never happen. As a result, the more trade increases, the more labor 
market conditions matter for aggregate industry productivity dynamics and for the 
long-run welfare of workers. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
TRADE, JOB FLOWS AND AGGREGATE INDUSTRY 
PRODUCTIVITY IN U.S. MANUFACTURING 
 
 
 
II.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates empirically how job flows influences aggregate 
industrial productivity in the United States, as it becomes more open to trade. The 
United States has experienced with the coexistence of high import share and high 
export share within industry, i.e. the intra-industry trade pattern. This implies that 
although the increased import penetration threatens unproductive non-exporting 
plants, the increased export propensity in the same industry allows a greater 
chance for incumbent exporting plants to sell more abroad and for new exporting 
plants to enter a market. In the situation, the productivity gains from trade-
liberalization could stem from the reallocation of domestic resources from 
unproductive plants toward more productive ones within industry as well as across 
industries. This makes us pay more attention on the selection effect of trade in 
Melitz (2003), which implies that the competition in labor market induced by trade 
liberalization removes the least productive plants from the market and boosts the 
aggregate industrial productivity. Consequently, this paper attempts to examine 
how job flow affects the selection effect of trade. 
Recent trade theories tell us the substantial role of job flow in the selection 
effect process. Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2008) consider job creation in 
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exporting plants as the catalyst of the selection effect. They show that as trade 
liberalization widens the gap of wage between an exporting plant and a non-
exporting plant, workers with high abilities in non-exporting plants have the 
greater motivation to move toward exporting plants, and therefore these transfers 
accelerates the selection effect of trade because non-exporting plants will be more 
unproductive. Accordingly, job creation can boost aggregate industrial productivity, 
as the economy becomes more open to trade.  
Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008) cast the crucial clue on the 
mechanism regarding the impact of job destruction on the selection effect of trade. 
By introducing the average of workers abilities in a firm into the production 
function, they attempt to explain the firm behavior of screening inside and outside 
workers with abilities below the cut-off after trade-liberalization. Trade 
liberalization makes non-exporters faced with the decreased domestic market share. 
To survive in this market, non-exporters attempt to downsize in order to have a 
higher chance of regaining productivity. In particular, in downsizing a plant, it is 
important that a plant can use flexibly the mechanism of sorting workers in terms 
of ability and screening workers with abilities below the cut-off. If this mechanism 
works well, job destruction can push up the aggregate industrial productivity.  
Lastly, based on Melitz (2003), Kang (2010) shows that with low job 
destruction and job creation, the selection effect of trade is less likely to occur. 
According to Melitz (2003), the labor market can be the crucial channel through 
which trade liberalization increases aggregate industrial productivity. In his 
theoretical model, the increased industrial real average wage by trade liberalization 
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triggers the selection effect of trade. The unproductive non-exporting firms cannot 
afford to pay it. Kang (2010) attempts to specify labor market conditions under 
which trade induce the increased real average wage, and concludes that with high 
union density, low job destruction, and low job creation, trade is likely to decrease 
the average real wage. That is, under these labor market conditions, the selection 
effect of trade may not exist, and even a negative selection effect may occur. As a 
result, this paper can hypothesize that high job destruction and high job creation 
would raise the aggregate industrial productivity, as the economy becomes more 
open to trade. 
To test empirically the hypothesis, this paper employs four datasets: U.S. 
Trade by Feenstra (1998), Import Weighted Tariffs by Schott, Job Creation and Job 
Destruction by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Kim (2006), and Manufacturing Industry 
Productivity Database by Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2000). Since plant‟s total 
factor productivity (TFP) tends to be persistent, I employ the dynamic panel 
analysis. Using the system GMM estimator to isolate the effect of the exogenous 
component of each explanatory variable on TFP, I find that import penetration is 
significantly and positively associated with the industrial TFP in the 10% level, and 
furthermore this magnitude is dependent on the level of job destruction. 
Additionally, tariffs negatively but insignificantly affect the industrial TFP in the 
10% level. However, the interaction term between job creation and tariffs is 
significant in the 10% level. So job creation can be considered as the channel which 
trade liberalization pushes up the aggregate industrial productivity.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In Section II, I explain the 
estimation strategy and dataset. Section III contains the results. Section IV 
concludes. 
 
 
II.2 Estimation Strategy and Data 
This paper estimates the effect of job flow on aggregate industrial 
productivity in trade liberalization. For model specification, it should note two facts. 
First, the relative differences in productivity between plants are persistent through 
time as shown in Bartelsman and Doms (2000). To allow for inertia of productivity, 
this paper employs the dynamic panel model. The other is the difficulty to measure 
trade liberalization. Basically, I use import penetration and export propensity in 
equation (1). This can reflect that import penetration is more related to job creation 
and export is related to job creation. As a result, equation (1) has the interaction 
term between import penetration and job destruction as well as that between export 
propensity and job creation.  
tststststststs
tststststs
posnegimpimp
negposrshipTFPTFP
,,,8,7,,6,5
,4,3,21,1,
][expexp][
lnlnln



 
      (1) 
where tsTFP ,ln is the logarithm of total factor productivity (TFP) in the industry s  at 
time t ; tsrship ,ln  is the logarithm of real shipment of industry s  at time; tspos ,  is the 
job creation of industry s  at time t ; tsneg ,  is the job destruction of industry s  at 
time t ; tsimp ,  is the import penetration ratio of industry s  at time t ; ts,exp  is the 
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export propensity ratio of industry s  at time t ; ts ,  is consisted of the s  industry-
specific effect ( s ), the time-specific effect ( t ), and the error-term ( ts, ).  
For robustness to measure trade liberalization, this paper also employs import-
weighted tariff in equation (2). 
tstststststs
tststststs
postariffnegtarifftariff
negposrshipTFPTFP
,,,7,,6,5
,4,3,21,1,
][ln][lnln
lnlnln



 
   (2) 
where 
tstariff ,ln is the logarithm of import-weighted tariff in the industry s  at time t .  
The dynamic panel analysis forces us to consider the potential endogeneity 
problem of explanatory variables. To remove this concern, this paper uses the 
system GMM estimator that combines moment conditions for the regression in 
differences with moment conditions for the regression in levels as suggested by 
Blundell and Bond (1998). Under the assumptions on the autoregressive structure 
of error term and weakly exogeneity of explanatory variables, this estimator can 
control industry-specific fixed effect and avoid the endogeneity problem by using 
internal instrument variables that are based on lagged values of the explanatory 
variables. Accordingly, the consistency of this estimator depends on whether lagged 
values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments. The Sargan/Hansen test 
of overidentifying restrictions can check it. Additionally, this paper will report the 
result of marginal effects to consider the inquiry of this paper precisely.  
The estimation combines data from four sources: U.S. Trade by Feenstra 
(1998), Import Weighted Tariffs by Schott, Job Creation and Job Destruction by 
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Kim (2006), and Manufacturing Industry Productivity 
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Database by Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (2000).40 Specifically, Manufacturing 
Industry Productivity Database reports two kinds of annul industrial TFP level 
values between 1958 and 1996: a four-factor level (capital, production worker hours, 
nonproduction workers, and materials) and a five-factor level (materials are divided 
into nonenergy materials and energy). This paper uses a four-factor level because 
the two are extremely high correlated. The above datasets are overlapped in 391 4-
digit SIC industries from 1974 to 1994. 
 
 
II.3 Empirical Results 
Before proceeding to the interpretation of the results in <Table 7>, we 
should check whether the specification tests generally support the system GMM 
estimator. In all cases, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. The 
tests of serial correlation show that the error term is first-order serially correlated. 
These results support the validity of instruments and thus allow us to draw 
inferences regarding the link between the explanatory variables and TFP. 
According to column 1 in <Table 7>, import penetration affects TFP 
positively and significantly in the 10% level, while export propensity is negatively 
and insignificant associated with TFP. Particularly, the interaction term between 
import penetration and job destruction in column 2 suggests that job destruction 
                              
40 Schott provides this dataset on his website (http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm). The 
other datasets are provided by NBER website. 
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can be the crucial channel through which imports affect aggregate industrial 
productivity. The first column of <Table 8> indicates that the more job destruction 
occurs, the bigger the impact of import on TFP is.41  
 Column 3, 4 in <Table 7> show that the level of tariffs affects negatively and 
insignificantly TFP, and this influence is significantly dependent on job creation in 
the 5% level. According to <Table 9>, the marginal effect of tariffs is changed from 
positive to negative, which means that high job creation and destruction cause trade 
liberalization to push up the aggregate industrial productivity.    
 
 
II.4 Concluding Remark 
Since job flow results from firms‟ and workers‟ responses/adjustment to outer 
shocks, job creation and job destruction can affect the distribution of aggregate 
industrial productivity across existing employment relationship. This paper 
considers trade liberalization as one of outer shocks with which firms and workers 
are confronted. The findings in this paper indicate that job flow can be the crucial 
channel through which trade liberalization boosts the aggregate industrial 
productivity.  
                              
41 When the value of job destruction is around 4.08, this marginal effect is zero.  
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CHAPTER III  
 
TRADE, JOB FLOWS AND AGGREGATE INDUSTRY 
PRODUCTIVITY IN U.S. MANUFACTURING 
 
 
 
III.1 Introduction 
Integrated product markets potentially increase aggregate productivity 
through two main effects: the international R&D spillover effect and the selection 
effect.42 Since the selection effect reallocates resources toward the more productive 
firms by driving out the least productive ones, this process could be hindered by 
rigidity in domestic labor market institutions. Although this suggests the role of 
labor market institutions in an open economy, little is known about the impact of 
labor market rigidity on the selection effect. 43 Therefore, this paper examines 
empirically how rigidity in domestic labor market institutions influences the 
selection effect as the economy becomes more open to trade. 
The importance of this question arises from the possibility of negative 
selection effect. Recently, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) suggest that under unilateral 
trade, there can be the negative selection effect that hurt aggregate productivity. 
Based on this paper, Archaya and Keller (2007) find the empirical evidence of 
                              
42 In this paper, the selection effect implies the positive selection effect.  
43 The research on the impact of institutions on the international R&D spillover effect has been done 
by Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009). They show that well-established institutions such as the 
ease of doing business, the quality of tertiary education, the strength of intellectual property rights, 
and the origins of legal system enhance the international spillover effect. However, they did not find 
significant evidence from financial market development, labor market institutions, governance, and 
ease of trading across borders. 
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negative selection effect in OECD countries, and furthermore conclude that foreign 
R&D spillover effect can be offset by the negative selection effect in the long run. 
These studies consider product market competition as the mechanism that causes 
the selection effect. Therefore, one can expect that if the product market regulations 
prevent this mechanism, the selection effect may not occur or it may be negative. In 
this way, Archaya and Keller examine the impact of rigidity in the product market 
institutions on the selection effect by using data on the regulation of entry from the 
World Bank Investment Climate Survey, and find that high entry barriers slow 
down the process of market share reallocation between firms that is induced by 
import liberalization. 
Melitz (2003) suggests the labor market competition as the alternative 
mechanism to cause the selection effect. Therefore, to identify the role of rigidity in 
labor market institutions in the selection effect, my work builds on Melitz‟s (2003) 
argument on selection effect: after trade liberalization, the increase of average real 
wage induced by exports pushes up aggregate productivity through removing the 
least productive firms from the market. This increased average real wage reflects 
the increased labor demand that stems from incumbent exporters‟ capacity 
expansion and the new exporters‟ entry. However, while Melitz‟s model assumes a 
flexible labor market, the labor demand in reality has been troubled by rigidity in 
labor market institution, for example, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). 
The continental European countries experienced with “Eurosclerosis”, high 
unemployment due to slow job creation in 1970-80‟s relative to U.S. In the analysis 
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of this phenomenon, EPL has been pointed out as one of the main determinants 
because it affects the labor demand negatively. 
The negative impact of EPL on labor demand results from the increased 
firm‟s firing costs by EPL. Since a potential firm‟s decision to enter and an 
incumbent‟s decision to expand its capacity are mainly dependent not only on the 
increase of expected profits but also on the probability of failure, one of the critical 
determinants of these decisions should be the firing costs. In the same vein, 
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) conclude that EPL perturbs the reallocation of 
resources from declining firms to more dynamic ones with above average 
productivity growth. Through using variation in the adoption of EPL across U.S. 
states, Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007) find that the introduction of wrongful-
discharge protections causes low employment flow and less firm entry. 
Furthermore, the studies connected to business cycle suggest more interesting 
evidence. According to Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola (1990), Garibaldi (1998) 
and Messina and Vallanti (2007), stricter EPL decreases employment volatility (job 
creation and job destruction) over the business cycle because EPL affects both the 
incentives to hire and to dismiss workers. Consequently, the stringent EPL reduces 
job creation and slows the flow of labor resources into emerging high productivity 
firms. 
Melitz (2003) and Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) consider job 
creation at the incumbent and new exporting firms as a catalyst for the selection 
effect of trade. However, EPL hinders the operation of this catalyst. Seker (2010) 
show that EPL discourages firms from exporting by using a rich set of firm level 
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data from 26 countries in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region.44 This 
implies that the stringent EPL makes the incumbent and new exporting firms 
difficult to expand their capacity and enter the foreign market, which is likely to 
reduce the potential exports. Therefore, the export labor demand will not increase 
as much as in a more flexible labor market, which will not allow the real wage to 
rise sufficiently. As a result, firms with marginal productivity in a rigid labor 
market are more likely to survive than in a flexible labor market because the 
smaller increase in average real wage is affordable to firms with marginal 
productivity. This reduces the selection effect.45  
Furthermore, the labor market rigidity can cause the negative selection 
effect of trade. Trade liberalization in developed countries forces us to consider the 
negative impact of increased imports on the average real wage in the same sectors 
influenced by increased exports because the intra-industry trade dominates. Kang 
(2010) finds the crucial role of labor market conditions in determining the impact of 
trade on average real wage by using U.S. dataset; that is, with low job destruction 
and job creation, the negative impact of imports on the average real wage exceeds 
the positive impact of exports, and therefore the effect of trade on the average real 
wage is likely to be negative. As mentioned above, EPL reduces job creation as well 
as job destruction. Therefore, the stricter the EPL is, the more likely that trade 
                              
44 Seker (2010) connects EPL to the investment climate for firms. 
45 This logic stems from Melitz‟s (2003) argument. Davidson, Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) can 
also explain the relationship between the selection effect and EPL; that is, if there are a few job 
creation at the incumbent and new exporting firms, the workers with high ability in non-exporting 
firms do not have the chance to transfer toward the exporting firms much. Therefore, the inactive 
transfer of workers with high ability in non-exporting firms cannot accelerate the selection effect of 
trade.    
- 46 - 
 
causes the average real wage to decrease. The decreased average real wage will 
cause the negative selection effect of trade because it enables the least productive 
firms to start business and survive in this market. Accordingly, the direction as well 
as size of selection effect induced by trade liberalization is likely to be determined 
by labor market institutions such as EPL that affect firms‟ labor demand. 
For the empirical approach, OECD countries provide a good laboratory 
because OECD countries trade with each other vibrantly and the characteristics of 
their labor markets are divergent. Due to this reason, this paper uses the Coe, 
Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009) dataset and Nickell (2006) dataset. The former 
provides information on R&D capital stocks, Total Factor Productivity (TFP), 
openness to trade, and other variables in 24 OECD countries during 1971-2004, 
while the latter has information about two indexes of EPL in 19 OECD countries 
from 1960 to 2004. However, two indexes of EPL in Nickell (2006) do not vary much 
across time within country. So I construct a new EPL index as the average of the 
two indexes and the product of them. Since the new EPL indexes reflect information 
on each EPL index in Nickell (2006), they can have more variation across time.  
In the dataset used for this research, there are more time-series observations 
than cross-section observations. Therefore this paper will conduct the panel unit 
root test and cointegration test.46 For the panel unit test, I will introduce Levin, 
Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003), Fisher in Maddala and 
Wu (1999) and Hadri (2000) tests. Pedroni (1999) test and Fisher test in Maddala 
                              
46 As roughly suggested in Wooldridge (2002), when time-series observations is equal or greater than 
cross-section observation, we need the assumption about the nature of the time dependence and time 
series analysis.  
- 47 - 
 
and Wu (1999) are employed in order to check the panel cointegration in this paper. 
Under the cointegration relationship, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is (super) 
consistent but it has a second order asymptotic bias in a small sample (Kao and 
Chiang, 1999). Thus this paper will use Dynamic OLS (DOLS) suggested by Kao 
and Chiang and Pedroni in order to fix OLS‟s problem.  
This paper finds that the interaction term between openness to trade and 
EPL is negatively associated with TFP. In other words, as EPL becomes more 
stringent, the negative selection effect of trade would reduce TFP. In addition, 
according to the marginal effect of openness to trade, a country with extremely 
strict EPL but low foreign R&D capital stocks can have the experience with 
decreasing TFP after trade liberalization because the negative selection effect 
offsets the international R&D spillovers.  
Te rest of the paper is organized as follows. I describe the estimation strategy 
and the data in Section II. The empirical results are presented in Section III. 
Section IV concludes. 
 
 
III.2 Estimation Strategy 
III.2.1 Model Specification 
Following common practice in panel cointegration studies, this paper 
examines the impact of EPL on the selection effect as economy becomes more open 
to trade. The early studies regarding the impact of trade on aggregate productivity 
suggest two main channels, i.e. international R&D spillover and selection effect. 
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Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009) investigated which institutions promote 
international R&D spillover. Particularly, they found that the labor market 
institution does not affect the international R&D spillover effect. However, as 
argued in the previous section, EPL is likely to be involved in the selection effect of 
trade because of raising firing costs. Therefore, in order to capture the two main 
channels, I extend the empirical equation in Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009) 
by adding an interaction term between openness to trade and EPL ( titi EPLm ,,  ). As 
a result, one can expect in equation (1) that the impact of trade openness on TFP 
can be divided into international R&D spillover effect ( ftiti Sm ,, ln ) and the selection 
effect ( titi LMRm ,,  ); that is, I can hypothesize that 3  and 6  are likely to have the 
positive and negative sign, respectively.  
titititi
f
titi
f
titi
d
titi EPLEPLmSmSmSTFP ,,7,,6,5,4,,3,21, ][ln]ln[lnln   ,  
                                            19,...,1i , 2004,...,1971t  (Eq. (1)) 
where i  is a country index; t  is a time index; tiTFP ,ln  is the logarithm of total factor 
productivity (TFP); dtiS ,ln  is the logarithm of the real domestic R&D capital stocks; 
f
tiS ,ln  is the logarithm of the real foreign R&D capital stocks; tim ,  is openness to 
trade; tiEPL ,  is Employment Protection Legislation; ti ,  is a well-defined error.  
In addition, this specification enables us to compare the relative magnitude 
of international R&D spillover effect and selection effect. It is important because of 
Archaya and Keller‟s (2007) argument that the negative selection effect can offset 
the international R&D spillover effects in the long run. Furthermore, equation (1) 
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will tell us specific conditions under which trade can hurt the aggregate 
productivity. For this, I will report the marginal effects of openness to trade ( tim , ). 
 
III.2.2 Data Description 
This paper utilizes two datasets. The first dataset is the Coe, Helpman, and 
Hoffmaister (2009) dataset that provides information on TFP, openness to trade, 
domestic R&D capital stocks, foreign R&D capital stocks, etc in 24 OECD countries 
from 1971 to 2004. According to Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, TFP is defined as 
the log of output minus a weighted average of labor and capital inputs using factor 
shares as weights. In the case of foreign R&D capital stocks, to address some 
critiques, they use three alternative weighting schemes: a bilateral-import weighted 
average of trading partners‟ domestic R&D capital stocks, the weighted average 
proposed by Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe (1998) and a simple average of 
trading partners‟ domestic R&D capital stocks. As shown in Lichtenberg and van 
Pottelsberghe (1998), their weighting scheme has less aggregation bias than Coe 
and Helpman‟s (1995) weighting scheme. So I will use this weighting scheme. 
The other dataset is from Nickell (2006). This dataset contains several 
indexes related to labor market institutions in 19 OECD countries from 1960 to 
2004. Among them, I choose two indexes of EPL because EPL can be used a proxy 
for firing costs. The first EPL index )_( ,tiNEPL  is the extended version of Nickell 
and Nunziate (2001) using the OECD labour market statistics data base. This EPL 
index‟s range is {0, 2} and increasing with the strictness of employment protection. 
The second EPL index )_( ,tiAEPL  is taken from Allard (2005) and ranging over {0, 
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5}. She offers EPL country EPL scores for 1950-2003, by reviewing changes of EPL 
documented by ILO‟s International Encyclopedia for Labor Law and Industrial 
Relations. Yet, although the data points of these EPL indexes are annualized, they 
do not vary sufficiently across time within country. Therefore, to reflect information 
on both the two EPL indexes, I construct a new index as the average of the two 
index and the product of the two indexes; that is, 
}_)5/2(_{)2/1(1 ,,, tititi AEPLNEPLEPL   and tititi AEPLNEPLEPL ,,, __2  . 
Since the empirical analysis should use the overlapping part of the two 
above datasets, the sample in this paper includes 19 OECD countries from 1971 to 
2004.47 <Table 10> shows two kinds of summary statistics. According to Panel (a) 
in <Table 10>, Anglo-Saxon countries (ASC) have a higher growth of TFP on 
average than continental European countries (CEC).48 In the case of openness to 
trade, the lower values in ASC are attributed to including bigger countries such 
as Canada and the U.S. because those indexes are calculated by dividing the real 
GDP. As expected, continental European countries have stricter EPL, while 
Anglo-Saxon countries have a more flexible labor market in terms of EPL. Panel 
(b) reports the minimum, average, and maximum values of variables in order to 
calculate the marginal effect of openness to trade.  
 
 
                              
47 Some countries are excluded in this paper; Greece, Iceland, Israel, Portugal, and South Korea.  
48  Continental European countries (CEC) are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Anglo-Saxon countries 
(ACS) are Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, U.K., and U.S.   
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III.3. Econometric Issues 
III.3.1. Testing for integration 
To identify a possible long run relationship, we have to start with verifying 
that all variables are integrated of order one in levels. Therefore, this paper 
employs the several panel unit root tests because no dominant performance of one 
test over the others for all cases considered: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Im, Pearan 
and Shin (2003), Maddala and Wu (1999), and Hadri (2000).  
Levin, Lin, and Chu (LLC, 2002) propose a procedure using pooled t-statistic 
of estimator to evaluate the null hypothesis that all cross-sections contain a unit 
root against the alternative that all cross-sections are stationary. The major 
limitation of LLC test stems from assuming a common autoregressive structure for 
all of the series. To address this limitation, Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS, 2003) 
propose t-bar statistic. By using the mean of ADF statistics computed for each cross-
section unit in the panel, IPS has the testing procedure to allow for simultaneous 
stationary and non-stationary series; that is, the alternative hypothesis allows for 
some (but not all) of the individual series to have unit roots. By Lindeberg-Levy 
central limit theorem, the standardized t-bar statistic converges to a standard 
normal distribution as N  under the null hypothesis. Im, Pesaran, and Shin 
(2003) show that if the underlying ADF regressions have a large enough lag order, 
the t-bar test is generally better than the LLC test. Like IPS, the Fisher-type test 
that proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999) also relaxes the restrictive assumption of 
LLC test. The Fisher-type test is based on a combination of the p-values of the test-
statistics for a unit root in each cross-sectional unit. The advantage of this test is 
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that one can use different lag lengths in the individual ADF regressions and it can 
be applied to any unit root test derived.  
Unlike LLC, IPS and the Fisher-type test, Hadri (2000) suggests the null 
hypothesis that there is no unit root in any of the series in the panel against the 
alternative of a unit root in the panel.49 To evaluate it, Hadri derives a residual-
based Lagrange multiplier test by extending Kwiatkowski, Phillips, and Shin (1992) 
method. Especially, testing for stationarity in a panel data has the advantage that 
as N grows the power of the test increases and the distributions of the test statistics 
get asymptotically normal. However, similar to LLC, Hadri test also are the 
common unit root test that assumes a common autoregressive structure for all of 
the series. 
 
III.3.2. Testing for cointegration 
Since valid economic inferences can be drawn under cointegrating relations, 
the result of the panel unit root tests forces us to check the cointegration 
relationship in panel data. The panel cointegration test is to examine whether the 
error term is stationary, which guarantees that the regression is not spurious. This 
paper uses two cointegration tests: Pedroni (1999) test and Fisher test in Maddala 
and Wu (1999). Pedroni (1999) proposes seven tests for the null hypothesis of 
cointegration that allows for heterogeneous intercepts and trend coefficients across 
cross-sections. The seven tests are categorized into the homogenous alternative 
                              
49 DeJong and Whiteman‟s (1991) suggest that in deciding whether economic data are stationary or 
integrated, it is useful to perform test of the null hypothesis of stationarity as well as of a unit root. 
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hypotheses (the within-dimension test or panel statistics test in Pedroni) and the 
heterogeneous alternative ones (the between-dimension or group statistics test). 
The former is to assume the same autoregressive parameter across different 
countries in the unit root test for the residual, while the latter is to be based on 
averaging the individually estimated autoregressive for each country.  
As an additional test for cointegration, this paper uses Fisher test in 
Maddala and Wu (1999). This is underlain by Johansen methodology that is a 
likelihood-based (LR) panel test of cointegrating rank in heterogeneous panel 
models based on the average of the individual rank trace statistics. The proposed 
LR-bar statistic is very similar to the IPS t-bar statistic.   
 
III.3.3. Estimating the long run relationship 
Under the cointegration relationship, an OLS estimator is (super) consistent, 
but it has a second order asymptotic bias in a small sample so that its standard 
errors are not valid (Kao and Chiang, 1999). To construct valid t-statistics, the 
Dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimator adds leads and lags of the first difference of the 
right-hand variables in equation (1). As a result, we can construct equation (2) from 
equation (1):   
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][ln]ln[ln{
][ln]ln[lnln
,,7
,,6,5,4,,3,2
,7,,6,5,4,,3,21,
tiktik
ktiktik
f
ktikktik
f
ktiktik
K
Kk
d
ktik
tititi
f
titi
f
titi
d
titi
EPL
EPLmSmSmS
EPLEPLmSmSmSTFP
i
i









                                              
19,...,1i , 2004,...,1971t  (Eq. (2)) 
- 54 - 
 
According to Kao and Chiang (1999), the within-dimension DOLS estimator 
outperforms the OLS and fully-modified estimators, especially in a finite sample. 
However, the DOLS estimator has the disadvantage in that the inclusion of lead 
differences and lagged differences in the regression reduces degrees of freedom in 
estimation and handicaps prediction. So this paper prefers the parsimonious model 
removing independent variables with t-ratio smaller than 1.5 in equation (2).  
Pedroni (2001) also suggests another DOLS estimator, the group-mean 
dimension DOLS estimator. This method is to average the estimates that obtain 
from the conventional time series DOLS estimator applied to the ith country of the 
panel.50 For example, the group-mean panel DOLS estimator for the coefficient 2  
in equation (1) is  

N
i
iN
1
^
2
1
^
2  , where 
^
2
i  is the conventional time-series DOLS 
estimator applied to the ith country of the panel. And the associated t-statistics is 
computed as  

N
i i
tNt
1
2/1
^
^
2
^
2 
. According to Pedroni (2001), the group-mean 
dimension DOLS estimator has an advantage of a more flexible model due to 
allowing for heterogeneous cointegration vectors and appears to suffer from much 
lower small-sample size distortion than the within-dimension estimators. Therefore, 
to evaluate the robustness, this paper also reports the results of the group-mean 
DOLS estimator suggested by Pedroni. 
 
                              
50 I use E-Views 7 in order to conduct the DOLS estimator applied to the ith country of the panel. E-
Views 7 provides the automatic selection for the conventional time-series DOLS lags and leads and 
for long-run variance whitening regression.   
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III.4 Empirical Results 
The results of unit root tests and cointegration tests are reported in <Table 
11> and <Table 12>, respectively. According to <Table 11>, the results of panel unit 
root tests by the Hadri (2000), IPS, and Fisher (ADF) methods indicate that all 
variables are non-stationary, while the LLC tests show that the null hypotheses of 
unit root for some variables such as trade openness ( tim , ) are rejected at the 5% 
significant level. However, according to Maddala and Wu (1999) and Im, Pesaran, 
and Shin (2003), the Fisher (ADF) test and the IPS test are preferable to the LLC 
method. So we can consider all variables as being non-stationary. 
<Table 12> shows the results of Pedroni and Fisher cointegration tests. 
According to the way to construct a new EPL index, equation (1) is divided into two 
types of estimations. Additionally, the parsimonious model also does cointegration 
test. First, the results of Fisher test in panel (b) reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration as well as that of at most 1 cointegrating equation at the 1% 
significant level. For equation (1), therefore, it implies that at least two 
cointegration vectors exist. According to Pedroni cointegration tests in panel (a), 
three out of seven test statistics indicate that the estimating models are 
cointegrated at 5% significance. In particular, the panel ADF-statistics and group 
ADF-statistics reject the null of no co-integration at 1% significance. In addition, 
Pedroni‟s (1995) Monte Carlo simulation shows that in the case of small samples, 
the power of the three group statistics (between-dimension statistics) with the 
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heterogeneous alternative hypotheses is higher than that of the four panel statistics 
(within-group statistics) with the homogenous ones. Consequently, we can regard 
the parsimonious estimation models as being panel cointegrated because two out of 
three group statistics in each estimation model do not accept the null at 1 % 
significance.   
Since all variables in each specification are cointegrated according to <Table 
12>, the within-dimension DOLS and group-mean dimension DOLS can be the 
preferred estimators. <Table 13> present the estimation results based on the 
within-dimension DOLS (column 1-2, 4-5) and the group-mean dimension DOLS 
(column 3, 6) estimators. In the same way as <Table 12>, equation (1) is divided 
into two types of estimation model, respectively. The estimation results in <Table 
4> are similar to Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009) except that this paper adds 
the interaction terms between openness to trade and EPL. In comparison with Coe, 
Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009), the elasticity of domestic R&D capital stocks (
d
tiS ,ln ) has the same significant sign at the 1% level although the elasticities‟ sizes 
are relatively big.51 
The important point to note in <Table 13> is that the interaction terms 
between openness to trade and EPL in each column are negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The higher the openness to trade is, the more the 
domestic TFP is likely to be affected by two main channels: the international R&D 
                              
51 The coefficient of domestic R&D stock ( d
tiS ,ln ) in Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (2009) is 0.095, 
while that is about 0.18 in this paper. This gap may come from excluding some countries and the 
human capital variable.   
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spillover effect and the selection effect. Since ftiti Sm ,, ln   is included in equation (1) 
to capture the foreign R&D spillover effect, another interaction term ( titi EPLm ,,  ) is 
likely to reflect the selection effect of trade. Therefore, the negative coefficient of 
titi EPLm ,,   implies that the stricter the EPL is, the more the TFP is likely to 
decrease due to the negative selection effect.  
Since the marginal effect of openness to trade in equation (1) depends on the 
foreign R&D capital stocks and EPL, the results in <Table 14> show which 
conditions cause the negative selection effect to offset the foreign R&D spillover 
effects. This is related to Archaya and Keller (2007). Unlike Archarya and Keller 
(2007), who focus on the effect of product market competition, this paper pays more 
attention to the effect of labor market competition. Thus, this paper can suggest 
which labor market conditions enable the negative selection effect to crowd out the 
international R&D spillover effect. To do this, I calculate the derivatives of 
openness to trade at the minimum, average and maximum values of EPL, 
respectively, given the average of foreign R&D capital stocks. As shown in each 
column, the marginal effect of openness to trade decreases according to the increase 
in EPL. More interestingly, under the minimum of foreign R&D capital stocks and 
maximum of EPL, the marginal effect is significantly negative; that is, if a country 
with extremely high labor market rigidity but low foreign R&D capital stocks is 
open, the openness to trade could cause this country to experience decreasing TFP 
because the international R&D spillover effect is offset by the negative selection 
effect. To obtain more specific implications, I also present the TFP marginal effects 
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of trade at the Continental European Countries‟ (CEC) average of EPL and foreign 
R&D capital stocks and at the U.S. average of them. The difference of the two 
marginal effects can shed crucial light on why the productivity gap between 
European countries and U.S. has been widen since 1970s. 
The results in <Table 15> provide the suggestive evidence on the 
relationship between EPL and productivity. Looking at the empirical literature, the 
impact of EPL on productivity is ambiguous so far. Lagos (2006) argues that if 
stringent EPL raises reservation wages, average productivity can increase simply 
because firms become more selective and less productive matches are not realized. 
However, as the economy becomes more open to trade, the impact of EPL on 
reallocating workers across industries as well as between firms is more important. 
Wasmer (2006) suggests that since EPL induces the substitution of specific for 
general skills, it may have a negative effect on productivity in the presence of major 
shocks which cause workers to be reallocated across industries and make industry-
specific skills useless. In a consequence, if trade openness works as shocks in the 
economy, the impact of EPL on aggregate productivity can be dependent on the 
level of trade openness. The marginal effect of EPL in <Table 15> supports this 
argument.  
<Table 13> also reports the group-mean DOLS results. Those results enable 
us to evaluate the robustness of the within-dimension DOLS results. Although the 
magnitude of coefficients is somewhat different, the sign of coefficients is consistent 
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to that of coefficients in the within-dimension DOLS; 52  that is, Group-Mean 
columns in <Table 13> shows that the interaction terms between trade openness 
and EPL are negatively and significantly associated with the logarithm of TFP at 
the 1% level. Putting these results together, we can conclude that as the economy 
becomes more open to trade, EPL hurts the TFP by perturbing the selection effect. 
 
 
III.5 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the impact of EPL on the selection effect as the 
economy becomes more open to trade by using panel cointegration techniques. I 
found that the interaction term between openness to trade and EPL is negatively 
associated with TFP. That is, higher labor market rigidity in an open economy 
reduces the TFP through the negative selection effect. In addition, according to the 
marginal effect of openness to trade, a country with extremely strict EPL but low 
foreign R&D capital stocks could have the experience with decreasing TFP after 
trade liberalization. Consequently, these results suggest that trade reforms and 
labor market reforms are likely to be complementary.  
                              
52 The coefficients of interaction term between trade openness and EPL in the group-mean DOLS 
results are very bigger than these in the within-mean DOLS results. This is attributed to U.K. and 
U.S. Without these countries, the results are very similar to within-mean DOLS results.      
.   
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<Figure 1> The schedule of the residual wage to abilities in low degree of trade openness 
 
 
<Figure 2> The schedule of the residual wage to abilities in higher degree of trade openness 
 
Notes:
 n
ca  is the cut-off of non-exporting firm. 
e
ca  is the cut-off of exporting firm.  
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<Figure 3> The distribution between 1983 and 1994 in the manufacturing sector  
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<Figure 4> Cumulative distribution functions of residual wages between 1983 and 1994 in the 
industries with a high change rate of import penetration and job destruction  
 
Panel (a): Logging industry  
 
Panel (b): Office and Accounting machines industry  
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<Figure 5> Cumulative distribution functions of residual wages between 1983 and 
1994 in the industries with a high change rate of import penetration but a low 
change rate of job destruction  
Panel (a): Plastics, Synthetics and Resins industry  
 
Panel (b): Paints, Varnishes and related industry  
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<Table 1> Regression results of a Mincerian equation 
 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Exp 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.067 0.064 0.064 0.063 0.061 0.06 0.06 0.061 0.063 
Exp2 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
-
0.000
6 
ed2 0.157 0.172 0.173 0.228 0.194 0.143 0.076 0.093 0.087 0.131 0.104 0.114 
ed3 0.269 0.252 0.253 0.294 0.268 0.237 0.208 0.214 0.167 0.201 0.219 0.178 
ed4 0.313 0.324 0.333 0.344 0.313 0.326 0.25 0.248 0.236 0.277 0.277 0.23 
ed5 0.361 0.355 0.396 0.418 0.385 0.345 0.271 0.274 0.298 0.300 0.307 0.288 
ed6 0.482 0.489 0.497 0.531 0.515 0.467 0.394 0.399 0.422 0.448 0.422 0.433 
ed7 0.617 0.613 0.638 0.688 0.676 0.614 0.552 0.574 0.585 0.595 0.582 0.577 
ed8 0.846 0.853 0.897 0.958 0.946 0.91 0.819 0.847 0.861 0.939 0.912 0.897 
ed9 0.992 1.041 1.066 1.124 1.126 1.058 1.009 1.038 1.062 1.125 1.118 1.151 
cons -0.10 -0.13 -0.17 -0.25 -0.19 -0.15 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.16 -0.18 -0.23 
R2 0.357 0.372 0.381 0.396 0.399 0.388 0.384 0.401 0.397 0.396 0.399 0.388 
n 22528 23483 23600 23127 22518 21517 21855 22364 20966 20109 19438 18575 
Stdev
b
 
0.293 0.305 0.315 0.325 0.337 0.326 0.324 0.333 0.347 0.361 0.356 0.370 
(ed8-
ed6)
c
 
0.364 0.364 0.400 0.427 0.431 0.443 0.425 0.448 0.439 0.491 0.490 0.464 
Notes: a:Exp is the experience measured by a proxy variable, age. And the nine schooling 
dummies are for 0-4, 5-8, 10, 11, 12, 13-15, 16, and 17+. In order to avoid multicollinearity, 
the dummy for 0-4 is excluded. b:Stdev is the standard deviation of coefficients of ed2-ed9. 
c:(ed8-e6) represents the college premium. 
 
 
<Table 2> Summary Statistics 
 Obs. Average St.Dev. Min Max. 
Average of log(residual wage) 888 -0.028 0.107 -0.347 0.273 
10th percentile of log(residual wage) 888 -0.500 0.132 -1.119 -0.042 
Log(real shipment) 888 23.76 1.068 20.403 26.311 
Union density 888 0.256 0.140 0 0.684 
Import penetration 888 0.131 0.134 0.000032 0.800 
Export propensity 888 0.084 0.086 0.000001 0.575 
Tariff 876 0.047 0.036 0 0.228 
Job creation 888 8.083 3.270 1.303 26.119 
Job destruction 888 10.527 4.875 1.738 47.841 
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<Table 3a> Regression results: Dependent variable = Average residual wage 
 OLS Within 
SYS-
GMM 
SYS-
GMM 
SYS-
GMM 
SYS-
GMM 
1, tsRwage  0.846*** 
(0.019) 
0.231*** 
(0.071) 
0.755*** 
(0.079) 
0.737*** 
(0.086) 
0.785*** 
(0.084) 
0.772*** 
(0.087) 
tsship ,ln  0.0024 
(0.0021) 
0.0069 
(0.025) 
0.0031 
(0.0036) 
0.0048 
(0.0079) 
0.00021 
(0.0075) 
-0.0038 
(0.0068) 
tsuni ,  0.023* 
(0.013) 
0.091** 
(0.044) 
0.125 
(0.088) 
0.00034 
(0.108) 
 
 
 
tsneg ,  
    
0.0020 
(0.0021) 
 
tspos ,  
     
0.0052 
(0.0039) 
tsimport ,ln  
-0.0035* 
(0.0018) 
-0.0051 
(0.0078) 
-0.011* 
(0.0062) 
0.0091 
(0.0099) 
-0.039*** 
(0.014) 
-0.015* 
(0.0078) 
    tsuni ,  
   
-0.053* 
(0.028) 
  
    tsneg ,  
    
0.0019** 
(0.00089) 
 
tsort ,expln  0.0043** 
(0.0019) 
0.0101* 
(0.0053) 
0.016** 
(0.0060) 
0.0034 
(0.015) 
0.021** 
(0.0083) 
0.0027 
(0.0065) 
    tsuni ,  
   
0.012 
(0.040) 
  
    tspos ,  
     
0.0015* 
(0.00086) 
R2   
Time Dummy 
0.811 
Yes 
0.693  
Yes 
. 
 Yes 
. 
Yes 
. 
Yes 
. 
Yes 
Obs. 814 814 814 814 814 814 
AR(1)/AR(2) / / 0.00/0.599 0.00/0.569 0.00/0.466 0.00/0.471 
Sargan   0.712 0.850 0.786 0.691 
Notes: a: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Significant variables at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. b: The standard 
errors in Within are corrected using a bootstrapping procedure. c: This system-GMM uses 
lags up to t-4 as instruments to avoid overfitting biases.  
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<Table 3b> Marginal effects of import penetration and export propensity in column 4 
 Import Export 
Min 0.0078(0.0093) 0.0037(0.014) 
Median -0.0032(0.0068) 0.0063(0.0074) 
Max -0.024(0.013)* 0.011(0.012) 
Notes: Standard errors are calculated by delta method and reported in brackets. Significant 
variables at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 
 
<Table 3c> Marginal effects of import penetration in column 5 and export propensity in 
column 6 
 Import Export 
Min -0.036(0.013)*** 0.0047 (0.0060) 
Median -0.022(0.0079)*** 0.015 (0.0065)** 
Max 0.030(0.022) 0.043 (0.020)** 
Notes: Standard errors are calculated by delta method and reported in brackets. Significant 
variables at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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<Table 4a> Regression results: Dependent variable = 10th-percentile residual wage 
 OLS Within SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
1, tsRw  0.644*** 
(0.041) 
0.017 
(0.054) 
0.300** 
(0.147) 
0.317** 
(0.153) 
0.511*** 
(0.168) 
tsrship ,ln  0.0077* 
(0.0045) 
-0.0078 
(0.076) 
0.012 
(0.015) 
0.020 
(0.022) 
0.0069 
(0.019) 
tsuni ,  0.124*** 
(0.030) 
0.201*** 
(0.059) 
0.368* 
(0.214) 
-0.055 
(0.285) 
 
tsneg ,  
    
0.00003 
(0.0037) 
tsimport ,ln  -0.0056 
(0.0040) 
0.00020 
(0.0095) 
-0.0047 
(0.013) 
0.0091 
(0.021) 
-0.059*** 
(0.015) 
     tsuni ,  
   
-0.092* 
(0.055) 
 
     tsneg ,  
    
0.0033*** 
(0.0013) 
tsort ,expln  0.0098** 
(0.0040) 
0.011 
(0.0071) 
0.029** 
(0.015) 
0.030* 
(0.017) 
0.057*** 
(0.016) 
R2/ Time 
Dummy 
0.564/Yes 0.140/Yes ./Yes ./Yes 
./Yes 
Obs. 814 814 814 814 814 
AR(1)/AR(2) / / 0.01/0.209 0.005/0.219 0.00/0.132 
Sargan   0.384 0.398 0.762 
Notes: a: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Significant variables at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. b: The standard 
errors in Within are corrected using a bootstrapping procedure. c: This system-GMM uses 
lags up to t-4 as instruments to avoid overfitting biases.  
 
 
 
<Table 4b> Marginal effects of import penetration in column 4 and 5 
 Column 4 (union) Column 5 (job destruction) 
Min 0.0067 (0.020) -0.053 (0.014)*** 
Median -0.012 (0.018) -0.028 (0.012)** 
Max -0.051 (0.030)* 0.065 (0.039)* 
Notes: Standard errors are calculated by delta method and reported in brackets. Significant 
variables at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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<Table 5> Regression results: Dependent variable = Average predicted wage 
 OLS Within SYS-GMM 
   1, tsRw  0.945(0.017) *** 0.292(0.051)*** 0.893(0.050)*** 
   tsrship ,ln  0.0031(0.002) 0.024(0.038) 0.0041(0.0024)* 
   tsuni ,  -0.0017(0.0090) -0.0047(0.027) 0.052(0.087) 
   tsimp ,ln  -0.00094(0.0014) -0.0064(0.0062) -0.004(0.007) 
   ts,expln  0.0013(0.0014) 0.00087(0.0049) 0.0090(0.0061) 
R2 / Time Dummy 0.894 / Yes 0.622 / Yes . / Yes 
Obs. 814 814 814 
AR(1) / AR(2)   0.00 / 0.516 
Sargan   0.399 
Notes: a: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Significant variables at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. b: The standard 
errors in Within are corrected using a bootstrapping procedure. c: This system-GMM uses 
lags up to t-4 as instruments to avoid overfitting biases.  
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<Table 6a> Regression results of Tariff: Dependent variable = Average residual 
wage and 10th-percentile residual wage 
Dependent variable Average Average 10
th
 10
th
 
 SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
   1, tsRwage  0.829*** 
(0.060) 
0.858*** 
(0.074) 
0.463*** 
(0.132) 
0.473*** 
(0.106) 
   tsrship ,ln  0.0043** 
(0.0021) 
0.0041 
(0.0026) 
0.0024 
(0.020) 
0.013* 
(0.0071) 
   tsuni ,  0.057 
(0.056) 
 
0.169 
(0.167) 
 
   tsneg ,  
 
0.000023 
(0.0016) 
 
0.0080* 
(0.0045) 
   tspos ,  
 
0.0068* 
(0.0040) 
  
   tstariff ,ln  -0.018 
(0.199) 
0.424 
(0.527) 
-0.689** 
(0.315) 
0.917 
(0.849) 
       tsneg ,  
 
-0.012 
(0.021) 
 
-0.142** 
(0.068) 
       tspos ,  
 
-0.060 
(0.047) 
  
R2 / Time Dummy ./Yes ./Yes ./Yes ./Yes 
Obs. 803 803 803 803 
AR(1)/AR(2) 0.00/0.778 0.00/0.498 0.00/0.160 0.00/0.217 
Sargan 0.790 0.838 0.500 0.504 
Notes: a: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Significant variables at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. b: The standard 
errors in Within are corrected using a bootstrapping procedure. c: This system-GMM uses 
lags up to t-7 as instruments to avoid overfitting biases. 
 
 
<Table 6b> Marginal effects of tariff in column 3 and 4 
 Column 2 (job turnover) Column 4 (job turnover) 
Min 0.268(0.416) 0.549(0.689) 
Median -0.154(0.178) -0.414(0.354) 
75
th
 -0.317(0.178)* -0.806(0.322)** 
Max or 99
th
  -0.9302(0.558)* -2.476(0.889)*** 
Notes: Standard errors are calculated by delta method and reported in brackets. Significant 
variables at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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<Table 7> Regression results: Dependent variable = tsTFP ,ln  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
1,ln tsTFP  0.892*** 
(0.035) 
0.846*** 
(0.012) 
0.933*** 
(0.040) 
0.891*** 
(0.027) 
tsrship ,ln  0.0027*** 
(0.00052) 
0.002**** 
(0.0059) 
0.0021*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0006) 
tsneg ,  
 
-0.0011*** 
(0.00028) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
tspos ,  
 
0.0010** 
(0.00050) 
 
0.001*** 
(0.00038) 
tsimport ,  
0.0066* 
(0.0035) 
-0.0043 
(0.0075) 
  
    tsneg ,  
 
0.0011** 
(0.00052) 
  
tsort ,exp  -0.00031 
(0.0011) 
0.0029 
(0.0041) 
  
    tspos ,  
 
-0.00021 
(0.00036) 
  
tstariff ,ln  
  
-0.00034 
(0.025) 
0.108** 
(0.0044) 
    tsneg ,  
   
-0.0033 
(0.0023) 
    tspos ,  
   
-0.0060** 
(0.0028) 
Time Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7819 7819 6636 6636 
AR(1)/AR(2) 0.00/0.529 0.00/0.818 0.00/0.383 0.00/0.443 
Over-identification 
test 
0.167 0.333 0.114 0.522 
Notes: a: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Significant variables at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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<Table 8> Marginal effects of import penetration, ts
ts
ts
neg
imp
TFP
,65
,
,ln
 


, and 
marginal effect of export propensity, ts
ts
ts
neg
TFP
,65
,
,
exp
ln
 


, from column 2 in 
<Table 7> 
 Import  Export 
Minimum tsneg ,  -0.0043 (0.0075)   Minimum tspos ,  0.0029 (0.0041) 
Average tsneg ,  0.0076 (0.0045)*   Average tspos ,  0.0012 (0.0015) 
Maximum tsneg ,  0.118 (0.054)**   Maximum tspos ,  -0.0085 (0.016) 
Notes: Standard errors are calculated by delta method and reported in brackets. Significant 
variables at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
<Table 9> Marginal Effect of tariffs: tsts
ts
ts
posneg
ltariff
TFP
,7,65
,
,ln  


 
 tsTFP ,ln  
Minimum tsneg ,  and tspos ,  0.108 (0.044)** 
Average tsneg ,  and tspos ,  0.022 (0.012)* 
Maximum tsneg ,  and tspos ,  -0.605 (0.295)** 
Notes: Standard errors are calculated by delta method and reported in brackets. Significant 
variables at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
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<Table 10> Summary statistics 
Panel (a) 
 F04/F71 Sf04/Sf71 M04 M71 Epl04 Epl71 Epl204 Epl271 
Australia  1.45 3.27 0.21 0.13 0.44 0.15 0.48 0 
Austria  1.74 7.45 0.46 0.27 0.82 0.35 1.58 0.30 
Belgium  1.80 5.36 0.80 0.47 0.91 0.65 1.97 0.71 
Canada 1.35 4.04 0.34 0.20 0.38 0.16 0.32 0.03 
Denmark 1.69 3.56 0.40 0.31 0.56 0.57 0.75 0.74 
Finland 2.16 4.61 0.32 0.25 0.80 0.59 1.54 0.77 
France 1.66 5.77 0.25 0.15 1.1 0.52 3.00 0.64 
Germany 1.55 4.69 0.33 0.19 0.81 0.76 1.64 1.33 
Ireland 3.72 5.93 0.69 0.41 0.47 0.23 0.52 0.12 
Italy 1.51 5.69 0.25 0.15 1.00 1.18 2.14 3.48 
Japan 1.72 4.21 0.11 0.09 0.58 0.68 0.84 1.14 
Netherlands 1.57 5.47 0.59 0.47 0.83 0.81 1.68 1.62 
New 
Zealand 
1.15 2.77 0.30 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.40 0.06 
Norway 2.42 3.22 0.29 0.38 0.98 1.05 2.35 2.72 
Spain 1.44 11.14 0.30 0.12 0.98 1.15 2.37 3.19 
Sweden 1.54 2.98 0.38 0.23 0.91 0.48 1.97 0.50 
Switzerland 1.10 4.42 0.39 0.30 0.49 0.27 0.56 0.17 
U.K. 1.78 6.52 0.28 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.32 0.09 
U.S. 1.32 9.23 0.15 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.01 
ASC 1.80 5.30 0.329 0.205 0.373 0.162 0.845 0.051 
CEC 1.68 5.36 0.397 0.275 0.845 0.695 1.795 1.346 
Notes: ASC (Anglo-Saxon countries) are Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, U.K., 
and U.S. CEC (Continental European countries) are Austria, Belgium, Demark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland 
 
Panel (b) 
 Obs. Average St.Dev. Min Max. 
tiTFP , : Total Factor Productivity 646 0.842 0.146 0.293 1.111 
d
tiS , : Domestic R&D 646 152042 356125 617 2448353 
f
tiS , : Foreign R&D 646 14474 15475 701 112422 
tim , : Openness to trade 646 0.308 0.150 0.055 0.849 
tiEPL ,1 : }_
5
2
_{
2
1
,, titi AEPLNEPL   646 0.699 0.361 0.055 1.405 
tiEPL ,2 : titi AEPLNEPL ,, __   646 1.515 1.301 0 4.902 
Notes: In tiNEPL ,_  and tiAEPL ,_  are taken from Nickell (2006) and Allard (2005), 
respectively.  
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<Table 11> Panel unit root tests 
 Common unit root tests Individual unit root tests 
 LLC Hadri Fisher (ADF) IPS 
tim ,  -1.870** 
(0.031) 
11.960*** 
(0.00) 
44.180 
(0.227) 
-0.994 
(0.160) 
tiEPL ,1  -0.900 
(0.184) 
7.589*** 
(0.00) 
45.742 
(0.128) 
-0.407 
(0.342) 
tiEPL ,2  -2.023** 
(0.022) 
6.362*** 
(0.00) 
43.145 
(0.192) 
-0.171 
(0.432) 
tiTFP ,ln   -0.846 
(0.199) 
14.840*** 
(0.00) 
30.013 
(0.819) 
1.001 
(0.842) 
d
tiS ,ln  0.082 
(0.533) 
14.944*** 
(0.00) 
19.195 
(0.995) 
4.112 
(1.00) 
f
tiS ,ln  -4.155*** 
(0.00) 
15.712*** 
(0.00) 
18.400 
(0.997) 
1.475 
(0.930) 
f
titi Sm ,, ln  -0.258 
(0.398) 
13.761*** 
(0.00) 
23.420 
(0.970) 
1.570 
(0.912) 
titi EPLm ,, 1  5.815 
(1.00) 
13.276*** 
(0.00) 
40.948 
(0.342) 
-1.197 
(0.116) 
titi EPLm ,, 2  -2.179** 
(0.02) 
6.520*** 
(0.00) 
45.432 
(0.190) 
-0.819 
(0.207) 
Notes: (a) In Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2002), the unit root is 
the null hypothesis to be tested whereas Hadir (2000) tests the null hypothesis of 
stationary. (b) Both tests are based on fixed effect model. *, **, *** indicate the parameters 
that are significant at 10%, 5%, 1% probability level respectively. In parenthesis, critical 
probabilities are given. (c) Tests are based on E-veiws7.0. All ADF tests include a constant, 
and the optimal number of lags is chosen according to modified Schwatz. The long run 
variance is estimated using the Bartlett kernel with automatic spectral window bandwidth 
selection as in Newey-West. 
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<Table 12> Panel cointegration tests 
(a) Pedroni 
  Eq. (1) with tiEPL ,1  Eq. (1) with tiEPL ,2  
   Parsimonious  Parsimonious 
Panel v 
-1.282 
(0.900) 
-2.758 
(0.997) 
-1.410 
(0.921) 
-3.384 
(1.00) 
 rho 
0.795 
(0.787) 
0.291 
(0.615) 
1.006 
(0.843) 
0.652 
(0.743) 
 PP 
-2.226** 
(0.013) 
-2.612*** 
(0.005) 
-1.975** 
(0.024) 
-2.609*** 
(0.005) 
 ADF 
-3.583*** 
(0.000) 
-3.831*** 
(0.000) 
-3.035*** 
(0.001) 
-4.413*** 
(0.000) 
Group rho 
2.790 
(0.997) 
0.693 
(0.756) 
2.908 
(0.998) 
2.286 
(0.989) 
 PP 
-0.737 
(0.230) 
-3.475*** 
(0.000) 
-0.622 
(0.267) 
-3.083*** 
(0.001) 
 ADF 
-3.115*** 
(0.001) 
-6.917*** 
(0.000) 
-2.763*** 
(0.003) 
-6.921*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: (a) Tests are based on the E-views 7.0. The optimal number of lags is chosen 
according to Schwarz. The long run variance is estimated using the Parzen spectral kernel 
with automatic spectral window bandwidth selection as in Newey-West (1994). (b) *, **, *** 
indicate that the test rejects the null of no cointegration at 10%, 5%, 1% probability level 
respectively. In parenthesis, critical probabilities are given.  
 
(b) Fisher (combined Johansen) 
Hypothesized # of CE(s) 
Eq. (1) with tiEPL ,1  Eq. (1) with tiEPL ,2  
 Parsimonious  Parsimonious 
None 709.1 *** 433.9*** 693.1*** 419.1*** 
At most 1 394.1 *** 234.8*** 386.8*** 228.9*** 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate that the test rejects the null of hypothesized number of 
cointegration at 10%, 5%, 1% probability level respectively. In parenthesis, critical 
probabilities are given. 
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<Table 13> lnTFP Estimation Results using DOLS 
 Eq. (1) with tiEPL ,1  Eq. (1) with tiEPL ,2  
 Within Within Between Within Within Between 
  Pars. Pars.  Pars. Pars. 
d
tiS ,ln  0.206*** 
(9.31) 
0.196*** 
(14.33) 
0.241*** 
(6.65) 
0.208*** 
(9.54) 
0.197*** 
(14.07) 
0.293*** 
(10.67) 
tim ,  
-3.606*** 
(-4.44) 
-2.689*** 
(-3.51) 
-4.070*** 
(-6.54) 
-3.565*** 
(-4.30) 
-2.915*** 
(-3.75) 
-4.176*** 
(-7.49) 
  
f
tiS ,ln  0.421*** 
(5.51) 
0.324*** 
(5.48) 
0.520*** 
(4.05) 
0.397*** 
(5.16) 
0.327*** 
(5.07) 
0.516*** 
(6.89) 
  ti
EPL ,  
-0.801** 
(-2.05) 
-0.756** 
(-2.14) 
-2.356*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.243*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.211** 
(-2.50) 
-2.494*** 
(-4.00) 
f
tiS ,ln  -0.043 
(-1.41) 
  -0.034 
(-1.17) 
  
tiEPL ,  0.227* 
(1.93) 
0.213** 
(2.06) 
0.879*** 
(2.67) 
0.084*** 
(3.18) 
0.076*** 
(3.06) 
0.613*** 
(3.03) 
Leads/lags 1/2 1/2 Maxing 1 1/2 1/2 Maxing 1 
CenteredR2 0.900 0.896  0.903 0.900  
Obs. 646 646 646 646 646 646 
Notes: (a) pars. is the parsimonious estimation model. (b) all regressions include 
unreported, country-specific constants. The conventional t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the parameters that are significant at 10%, 5%, 1% 
probability level respectively.  
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<Table 14> Marginal Effect of trade openness: 5,7,3
,
,
ln
ln
 


ti
f
ti
ti
ti
EPLS
m
TFP
 
 Parsimonious model 
 with tiEPL ,1  with tiEPL ,2  
Average 
d
tiS ,ln , Min. tiEPL ,  0.221 (0.57) 0.076 (0.24) 
Average 
d
tiS ,ln , Average tiEPL ,  -0.278 (-1.19) -0.255 (-1.14) 
Average 
d
tiS ,ln , Max. tiEPL ,  -0.800 (-2.98)*** -0.957 (-3.84)*** 
Max. 
d
tiS ,ln , but Min. tiEPL ,  1.032 (2.81)*** 0.891 (3.10)*** 
Min. 
d
tiS ,ln , but Max. tiEPL ,  -1.596 (-4.47)*** -1.769 (-5.28)*** 
ASC‟s average: dtiS ,ln  and tiEPL ,  0.028 (0.09) 0.018 (0.06) 
U.S.‟s average: dtiS ,ln  and tiEPL ,  0.631 (1.78)* 0.513 (1.79)* 
CEC‟s average: dtiS ,ln  and tiEPL ,  -0.452 (-2.06)** -0.419 (-2.09)** 
Notes: (a) ASC (Anglo-Saxon countries) are Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, U.K., 
and U.S.. CEC (Continental European countries) are Austria, Belgium, Demark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. (b) The 
conventional t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the parameters that 
are significant at 10%, 5%, 1% probability level respectively. 
 
<Table 15> Marginal Effect of EPL: 7,4
,
,ln  


ti
ti
ti
m
EPL
TFP
 
 Parsimonious model 
 with tiEPL ,1  with tiEPL ,2  
Minimum tim ,  0.161 (1.98)** 0.061 (3.18)*** 
Average tim ,  -0.023 (-0.53) 0.010 (1.20) 
Maximum tim ,  -0.429 (-2.06)** -0.103 (-2.12)** 
Notes: The conventional t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate the 
parameters that are significant at 10%, 5%, 1% probability level respectively. 
 
